The "Virtues" of Positive Psychology.

Abstract

How have spokespersons for the positive psychology movement presented the movement to the public and to the profession of psychology? Moreover, what are the consequences for psychology of that presentation? These questions inform my assessment of the "virtues" of positive psychology, which I interpret in two ways. First, there are the ways in which the movement implicitly presents itself as virtuous, not least by constituting itself as a corrective to "negative psychology." Second, there are the ways in which Martin Seligman, in calling for a new and discrete scientific enterprise, promotes building "signature strengths" as routes to virtue and thus "authentic happiness." Alternative ways to conceptualize virtue and authenticity are considered, as are the epistemic problems that inhere in movements in general, and the positive psychology movement in particular.In his books Authentic Happiness (Seligman, 2002a) and Character Strengths and Virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), Martin Seligman, founder and leader of the positive psychology movement, enumerates six "ubiquitous" virtues. He finds these six virtues "endorsed by almost all religious and philosophical traditions" (Seligman, 2002a, p. 133), "valued in almost every culture" (p. 139). These ubiquitous six consist in "wisdom and knowledge," "courage," "love and humanity," "justice," "temperance," and "spirituality and transcendence" (2002a, p. 133). He also delineates the 24 "signature strengths" which are said to constitute the "several distinct routes to each of [the] six [virtues]" (2002a, p. 137)."Judgment/critical thinking/open-mindedness" are one of six routes to the virtue of "wisdom and knowledge." About this route Seligman wrote, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

Happiness Research: A Review of Critiques

“…In spite of claims to disinterested science (e.g. Seligman :129; Snyder and Lopez : xxiii), happiness research has been criticised for producing not simply descriptive but prescriptive accounts based upon unacknowledged value judgments and (western) social norms (Becker and Maracek ; Christopher ; Christopher and Hickinbottom ; Christopher et al ; Cromby and Willis ; Ehrenreich ; Held , , ; Sugarman ). Atkinson and Joyce (:134) point out mainstream approaches like the Stiglitz‐Sen‐Fitoussi Commission (Stiglitz et al ) tend to take ‘a normative approach to definition’, dealing with abstract concepts by breaking them down into constitutive components whose relative merits become subject to debate (Stiglitz et al ; Atkinson et al ; Atkinson ).…”

What can the science of well-being tell the discipline of psychiatry – and why might psychiatry listen?

“…For example, some psychologists remain sceptical that personality is readily flexible, that individuals should change existing coping styles that work for them, and that a positive attitude can solve complex human problems (Held, 2005). And as a reviewer of this article pointed out, it is unclear whether the kinds of 'well-being exercises' advocated by positive psychologists, among others, can really succeed in 'keeping the psychiatrist away'.…”

Round 3: Regarding Objectivity and Causality -- A Rejoinder to Fishman and Miller

“…But independent of the fate of any hoped-for moral realism/objectivism, my argument concerns the realism or objectivism of empirical claims, which moral claims (i.e., oughts or shoulds) are not (Held, 2005). Miller says that he is not clear about my "position on the moral aspects of clinical theory and practice" (p. 12).…”