The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise

Handel, Michael I.

doi:10.2307/2600234

Cited by 39 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Wohlstetter 1962; Betts 1980 /81, 2001; Handel 1980; Kam 1988; Vertzberger 1990). While there are exceptions, such as Levite (1987), who is somewhat more sanguine regarding the possibility of acquiring excellent warning that policy makers act on, Kam's (1988:232) fatalistic view that “successful surprise attacks are the general rule while their prevention is the exception” is representative of the pessimism that pervades the field (Handel 1977; Betts 1978). Like Kam, Betts (2001:160) allows that the intelligence system can be enhanced and that some of the problems that lead to failure can be fixed, but warns that “some can never be eliminated, with the result being that future unpleasant surprises are a certainty.” The special challenges associated with detecting and responding to planned terrorist attacks (as opposed to more conventional military operations mounted by states) exacerbate an already obstinate problem (Prados 2002:15–20).…”

Section: Conclusion: Lessons For Research and Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Parker

Stern

2005

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning‐response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory “cuts” derived from the literature—psychological, bureau‐organizational, and agenda‐political—are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance.

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Section: Conclusion: Lessons For Research and Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Parker

Stern

2005

Foreign Policy Analysis

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“…8 The second key proponent of the traditional view of intelligence failure was Michael Handel, who frequently argued, as in a 1977 article, 'Studies of military surprise have reached the point of diminishing returns'. 9 By this he meant that case studies had demonstrated that despite the presence of sufficient indicators -and even despite the sage advice from academics -intelligence professionals and decision-makers often failed to arrive at the correct conclusion. Handel described intelligence failures, and thus surprise, as inevitablebut he also pointed out that the advantage gained by surprise attack is often limited.…”

Section: The Traditional View Of Intelligence Failurementioning

confidence: 95%

Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism

Dahl¹

2005

Journal of Strategic Studies

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Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.

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“…Hence, the concept of intelligence failure is usually related to strategic surprise—those occasions when an event of strategic significance occurs without forewarning. It is from case studies analyzing such surprises that a number of the most significant contributions to the literature on intelligence have emerged (e.g., 9/11 Commission 2004; Handel 1977; Shlaim 1976; Wohlstetter 1962). In fact, as Stephen Marrin (2004, 657) reminds us, “failures” of varying kinds occur continually.…”

Section: Intelligence Theory and Intelligence Failurementioning

confidence: 99%

The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre‐War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

Phythian

2006

Politics & Policy

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Prewar U.S. intelligence suggested that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction. None were found in Iraq. The threat they posed proved to be illusory and not imminent. Was Iraq a case of intelligence failure? In his seminal 1978 study of the inevitability of intelligence failure, Richard Betts argued that the most crucial mistakes are most often made by decision‐making consumers. Through analyses of the findings of the reports of the 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and President Bush’s Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, this article finds failures occurring at numerous points across the intelligence cycle including, despite the conclusions of these two inquiries, the policy‐maker level. Although issues surrounding these shortcomings remain keenly contested and a full explanation will only be possible once the role of policy makers has been scrutinized, the analysis provides a rare window through which analysts may better understand the dynamics of intelligence failure.

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The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise

Cited by 39 publications

References 10 publications

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise

Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism

The Perfect Intelligence Failure? U.S. Pre‐War Intelligence on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction

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