Theological Correctness: Cognitive Constraint and the Study of Religion

Abstract

In both natural and religious thinking, people have ntultiple versions of the same concepts that may be contradictory. In the domain of religious concepts, these ntultiple levels of representation in single individuals may be termed "Theological Correctness." Versions of religioiis concepts range front fairly simple or concrete to very complex and abstract. Selection of the, concept to be used in any given context is largely dependent on the cognitive processing demands of the task. In tasks in which there is great derrtand to draw quick and rich inferences, a basic concept comprised largely of intuitive knowledge, is used. In tasks in which there is less demand, as when one is slowly and carefully riflecting on one's knowledge, more complicated, intuition violating theoretical concepts may be drawn upon. In the domain of religious concepts these concepts closely match traditional theology and so may be termed theological concepts. Implications for data gathering and theorizing in the study of religion are discussed. Finally, these observations suggest the. importance of insights from cognitive sciertce, for the study of religion.

Understanding Mortality and the Life of the Ancestors in Rural Madagascar

“…The design of Study 1 was based on a simple narrative manipulation that was likely to equate the cognitive demand of retrieving and using either conception. However, following J. L. Barrett's (1999) distinction between basic as compared to "theologically correct" concepts, and Sperber's (1997) distinction between intuitive and reflective beliefs, one could test whether, in a cognitively demanding task that forces participants to reason quickly and on-the-fly, Vezo might preferentially access one of the two conceptions, perhaps irrespective of any narrative priming they receive. If so, this would indicate that the other conception requires more effort, a certain amount of conscious reflection, and the mobilization of theologically correct and explicitly held reflective beliefs.…”

Religious credence is not factual belief

“…Barrett (1999) argues that intuitive beliefs about agency are guiding subjects' recollection of the story.…”

How to Survive the Anthropocene: Adaptive Atheism and the Evolution of Homo deiparensis

“…Even if the latter were true it would, unfortunately, be irrelevant. Cross-cultural psychological research indicates that no matter what the intellectual elite and priestly class of a religious in-group says, the vast majority of regular believers immediately default to the naturally evolved biases toward detecting person-like, coalition-favoring gods when faced with real-life religious scenarios [37][38][39]. As if this were not bad enough, these evolved cognitive and coalitional mechanisms are so deeply intertwined that mental credulity about gods and ritually enhanced social congruity constantly strengthen one another, implicitly and somewhat automatically, all too easily obscuring and promoting the powerful biases that skew our readings of and reactions to problems like climate change.…”