Theories of coalition formation and the effects of reference groups

Murnighan, J. Keith; Komorita, S. S.; Szwajkowski, Eugene

doi:10.1016/s0022-1031(77)80009-7

Cited by 37 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In addition, it was found that there is a tendency for risky shifts to occur when the individuals' preferences are already in the direction of risk and for cautious shifts to occur when the individuals' preferences are already in the direction of caution. This tendency is termed the group polarization effect (Myers & Lamm, 1976). It was further found that shifts occur on attitudinal dimensions as well as on the risk dimension (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969).…”

Section: Relationship Of Present Research To Other Research On Group mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Social psychologists have focused on differences in the resources (votes or weights) that individuals control, rather than differences in the payoffs for coalitions. Laboratory studies (e.g., Chertkoff, 1971;Chertkoff & Esser, 1977;Kelley & Arrowood, 1960;Komorita & Moore, 1976;Michener, Fleishman, & Vaske, 1976;Murnighan, Komorita, & Szwajkowski, 1977;Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) have demonstrated that differences in resources affect the frequency with which different coalitions form and the payoffs which individuals with different re-' This research was supported by a grant from the Council of Academic Deans a t Northern Illinois University.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Coalition formation in triads with single-peaked payoff curves

Miller¹

1979

Syst. Res.

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Coalition formation in decision making of three-person group systems was studied using a coalition game. This was devised as an analogue for many situations in which groups make decisions, both in "real life" and in laboratory experiments. One of the important findings of the study was that in this game, unlike the games usually employed in coalition research, the "resources" that the triad members possessed had relatively little effect upon which members tended to enter into a coalition or upon which of the partners to a coalition tended to receive the larger payoff. Instead, the formation of coalitions tended to depend upon whether the payoff structure of the game made it possible for the partners in a particular coalition to reach an agreement giving both of them relatively large payoffs. The findings are discussed in relation to previous research on coalitions.

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Section: Relationship Of Present Research To Other Research On Group mentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition formation in triads with single-peaked payoff curves

Miller¹

1979

Syst. Res.

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“…The researchers found that the coalitions formed, a 30-20 coalition in the first instance and a 10-20 coalition in the second instance, were in accordance with the final predictions of bargaining theory. Research by Murnighan, Komorita, and Szwajkowski (1977), Komorita and Moore (1976), Komorita and Meek (1978), Komorita and Kravitz (1981), Rapoport and Kahan (1976), and Kravitz (1987) has also supported the theory. According to Murnighan (1985), the bargaining theory has received the most empirical support in the recent literature.…”

Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 60%

“…Characteristics of individuals (level of aspiration) that led to their exclusion from coalitions was studied by Komorita and Ellis (1988). Finally, research has focused on the characteristics of a purchase situation and their influence on coalition formation (Adrien & Press, 1968;Murnighan, Komorita, & Szwajkowski, 1977).…”

Section: Theories Of Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

Tadepalli

1992

International Journal of Conflict Management

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“…More specifically, the outcome of a coalition game is often a small resource coalition in which the payoff is allocated in proportion to resources (e.g. Chertkoff, 1971;Cole, Nail, & Pugh, 1995;Murnighan, Komorita, & Szwajkowski, 1977;Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957). In the 5(4 3 2)-game, for example, it is often observed that player B and player C form a BC-coalition in which both players obtain a payoff share that is approximately proportional to their contribution in terms of resources (Murnighan, 1991).…”

Section: Self-interest and Equity In Coalition Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The interplay of self‐interest and equity in coalition formation

Beest

Dijk

Wilke

2004

Euro J Social Psych

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In this paper we investigated the interplay of self-interest and equity concerns in coalition formation by manipulating the number of units in which the coalition payoff is made available, and by manipulating the way people are allowed to interact. Results of three experiments showed that when the coalition payoff was such that members of each possible coalition could obtain an equitable payoff share, the outcome tended to be coalitions that also maximized the payoff of its members. However, when the payoff was such that people had to make trade-offs between maximizing their payoff share and obtaining an equitable payoff share, it took longer to form a coalition and it was harder to maintain a coalition. Moreover, depending on the way people were allowed to interact, the final outcome was a coalition that maximized the payoff of its members or a coalition that provided them with an equitable payoff share.

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Theories of coalition formation and the effects of reference groups

Cited by 37 publications

References 18 publications

Coalition formation in triads with single-peaked payoff curves

Coalition formation in triads with single-peaked payoff curves

Conflict Management in Organizational Buying Behavior: The Role of Coalitions

The interplay of self‐interest and equity in coalition formation

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