We examined 120 Cyberball studies (N = 11,869) to determine the effect size of ostracism and conditions under which the effect may be reversed, eliminated, or small. Our analyses showed that (1) the average ostracism effect is large (d > |1.4|) and (2) generalizes across structural aspects (number of players, ostracism duration, number of tosses, type of needs scale), sampling aspects (gender, age, country), and types of dependent measure (interpersonal, intrapersonal, fundamental needs). Further, we test Williams’s (2009) proposition that the immediate impact of ostracism is resistant to moderation, but that moderation is more likely to be observed in delayed measures. Our findings suggest that (3) both first and last measures are susceptible to moderation and (4) time passed since being ostracized does not predict effect sizes of the last measure. Thus, support for this proposition is tenuous and we suggest modifications to the temporal need-threat model of ostracism.

Recent research indicates that ostracism is painful even in the face of mitigating circumstances. However, in all previous experiments, there have been no costs to inclusion or benefits for ostracism. If being included meant losing money and being ostracized meant retaining money, would individuals still be distressed when ostracized? In 2 studies, the authors attempted to "load the dice" against inclusion in favor of ostracism. Participants played a variant of Cyberball called euroyberball (pronounced Euroball), in which ostracism and inclusion were crossed with whether the participants earned or lost money for each ball toss they received. In 2 experiments, the authors found that even when being ostracized meant retaining more money than the other players, it was painful. In Study 2, the authors also introduced conditions in which participants were overincluded. In these conditions, participants were sensitive to financial incentives. However, even then participants felt worse when given no positive attention than when given punitive attention.

A social functional approach to emotions in bargaining: When communicating anger pays and when it backfires van Dijk, E.; van Kleef, G.A.; Steinel, W.; van Beest, I. General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: http://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. Of the interpersonal emotions during bargaining, anger has received most attention.The basic question that researchers have addressed is whether anger has disruptive or perhaps positive effects in bargaining (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2004a, b). The results of these studies provided support for the social functions approach described above. Van Kleef et al. (2004a, b), for example, compared how bargainers reacted to an angry opponent and to a happy opponent. For this purpose, they presented their participants a negotiation task, in which they could make the first offer.Subsequently, their (simulated) opponent made a preprogrammed counteroffer, after which participants made a new offer, and the negotiation process continued. During six rounds of offers and counteroffers, participants received emotional reactions from their opponent.These reactions either signaled that the opponent was angry or happy.

Beyond breathing, the regulation of body temperature—thermoregulation—is one of the most pressing concerns for many animals. A dysregulated body temperature has dire consequences for survival and development. Despite the high frequency of social thermoregulation occurring across many species, little is known about the role of social thermoregulation in human (social) psychological functioning. We outline a theory of social thermoregulation and reconsider earlier research on people’s expectations of their social world (i.e., attachment) and their prediction of the social world. We provide support and outline a research agenda that includes consequences for individual variation in self-regulatory strategies and capabilities. In our paper, we discuss physiological, neural, and social processes surrounding thermoregulation. Emphasizing social thermoregulation in particular, we appeal to the economy of action principle and the hierarchical organization of human thermoregulatory systems. We close with future directions of a crucial aspect of human functioning: the social regulation of body temperature.

Three studies examined the hypothesis that shared cognition and group identification can be each other's catalysts as well as driving forces behind multiparty negotiation outcomes that might not otherwise be realized. Experiment 1 demonstrates that clear links exist between communication, the development of shared cognition and group identification, and integrative outcomes. The subsequent experiments isolated the causal directions of these links. Experiment 2 showed that stronger group identification before interaction was associated with the development of shared cognition in a subsequent phase of negotiation, which then increased the attainment of integrative outcomes. Conversely, a direct manipulation of shared cognition in Experiment 3 resulted in stronger identification during negotiation, which then led to more integrative outcomes. Thus, we find support for the theoretical claim that group identification can be both the product of, and precursor to, the development of shared cognition, with communication functioning as the interface between the two.