Shared Cognition as a Product of, and Precursor to, Shared Identity in Negotiations

Swaab, Roderick I.; Postmes, Tom; Beest, Ilja van; Spears, Russell

doi:10.1177/0146167206294788

Cited by 107 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Hence, evidence has been found simultaneously for both models/processes within the same dataset (e.g. Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007 ).…”

Section: The Encapsulated Model Of Social Identity In Collective Actimentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action

Macchia

Louis

2016

Peace Psychology Book Series

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Crowd behaviour and collective action are integral to historical and political developments ; they are the hands that turn the wheels of confl ict and peace and propel societal change. Crowds engaging in collective action are the very embodiment of mass political mobilisation, as seen in countless examples from the Arab Spring to the Occupy movements to European anti-austerity rallies. In this chapter, we examine the contribution of social identity theory to understanding crowd behaviour and collective action, and discuss possibilities for continued theoretical integration and promoting social change. We fi rst discuss competing theories of crowd behaviour, showing how those based on the social identity approach have progressed our understanding. We also discuss how the application of such an approach to understanding specifi c riot events has led to a conceptual and theoretical synthesis of collective action and crowd behaviour. We then examine social identity explanations of collective action more broadly, before analysing the apparent disconnect between established models of crowd behaviour and those of collective action, with a view to theoretical integration. Finally, we address the role of social identity in peace and confl ict more broadly, and discuss future directions in this area of research. Theories of Crowd Behaviour: From Impulse to IdentityGiven the immense role of crowd behaviour in societal history and development , it makes sense that many competing theories have been proposed to explain it. Here we discuss only the main theories that have infl uenced the psychological study of crowds, reviewing their merits and historical progression. We also show how the

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“…Hence, evidence has been found simultaneously for both models/processes within the same dataset (e.g. Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007 ).…”

Section: The Encapsulated Model Of Social Identity In Collective Actimentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action

Macchia

Louis

2016

Peace Psychology Book Series

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…A useful approach to measuring trust has been devised by Jarvenpaa and Leidner (1998), who identify communication patterns that facilitate trust in virtual teams. According to Swaab et al (2007), shared identity can be assessed by four criteria, namely the feeling of connectedness, group identification, membership, and enjoyment. The communication climate can be measured by adapting the findings of Gibb (1961), for instance, who compares defensive and supportive message types that shape the climate in a procedural way.…”

Section: Operationalisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Communication Quality in Business Negotiations

2008

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The quality of a business negotiation process is usually assessed by its economic outcome, e.g. in terms of Pareto efficiency or distance to Nash equilibrium. We argue that this assessment method is insufficient in that it fails to provide a comprehensive analysis of business negotiations. Negotiators engage in highly complex communication tasks, and these communication processes should be analysed along with the outcome in the overall evaluation of a business negotiation. To this end, we will introduce Communication Quality as a new construct for analyzing the negotiation process. Furthermore, it will be argued that Communication Quality itself can affect economic negotiation outcomes both short-and long-term. We will present relevant aspects of Communication Quality, outline a scheme for its operationalisation and measurement, and discuss its probable impacts on business negotiations.

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“…These factors are critical for the development of rapport (i.e., mutual liking and positive feelings towards others) and cooperation (Drolet & Morris, 2000;McGinn, Milkman, & Nöth, 2012;Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, & Thompson, 2002;Sally, 1995;Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007), each of which should reduce the likelihood of deception (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). In addition to promoting rapport, FTF interaction also increases the risk of deception-signaling nonverbal cues leaking in the face of persistent questioning (Buller & Burgoon, 1996;Valley et al, 1998).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“I can't lie to your face”: Minimal face-to-face interaction promotes honesty

Zant

Kray

2014

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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Title"I can't lie to your face": Minimal face-to-face interaction promotes honesty H I G H L I G H T S• We randomly assign people to communicate face-to-face (FTF) or through an intermediary prior to and during a game.• We find that in-game FTF interaction promotes honesty relative to communication through an intermediary.• The effect of in-game communication medium was mediated by individuals' attunement to their moral-interest.• We rule out accounts involving mechanisms like rapport and perceived trust.• The effect was not moderated by the removal of anonymity during a pre-game interaction. Scholars have noted that face-to-face (FTF) interaction promotes honesty because it provides opportunities for conversation in which parties exchange information and build rapport. However, it is unclear whether FTF interaction promotes honesty even in the absence of opportunities for back-and-forth conversation. We hypothesized a minimal interaction effect whereby FTF interaction promotes honesty by increasing potential deceivers' consideration of their own moral-interest. To test this account of how FTF interaction may promote honesty, we used a modified version of the deception game (Gneezy, 2005). We found that people were more honest when communicating FTF as opposed to through an intermediary. While FTF interaction tended to promote honesty irrespective of whether it occurred prior to or during the game, the effect was more pronounced when it occurred during the game. The effect of in-game communication medium was mediated by the activation of potential deceivers' moral-interest. We also ruled out alternate accounts involving interpersonal liking, expected counterpart trust, and retaliation fear as honesty-promoting mechanisms. Furthermore, because these effects were not moderated by whether participants had been visually identified during a pre-game interaction, we suggest that our effects are distinct from theoretical accounts involving anonymity. a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f oPublished by Elsevier Inc.

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Shared Cognition as a Product of, and Precursor to, Shared Identity in Negotiations

Cited by 107 publications

References 45 publications

Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action

Crowd Behaviour and Collective Action

Communication Quality in Business Negotiations

“I can't lie to your face”: Minimal face-to-face interaction promotes honesty

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