Theorizing the role of executive heads in international organizations

Abstract

International Relations scholars have long neglected the question of leadership in international organizations. The structural turn in International Relations led to an aversion to analysing or theorizing the impact of individuals. Yet, empirical studies suggest that different leaders affect the extent to which international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and/or the capacity of a global agency to deliver public goods. It is difficult to study how and under what conditions leaders have an impact due to the challenges of attributing outcomes to a particular leader and great variation in their powers and operating context. We offer a starting point for overcoming these challenges. We identify three different types of constraints that executive heads face: legal-political, resource and bureaucratic. We argue that leaders can navigate and push back on each of these constraints and provide illustrations of this, drawing on existing literature and interviews with executive heads and senior management of international organizations. Executive heads of international organizations may operate in a constrained environment but this should not stop scholars from studying their impact.

COVID‐19 and Policy Responses by International Organizations: Crisis of Liberal International Order or Window of Opportunity?

“…It is more likely that more senior and experienced politicians will identify the opportunities in crises rather than solely focus on continuity of operations. Officials with experience at the highest level may also be more used to working across organizational boundaries and overcoming formal and institutional constraints (Hall and Woods, 2018 ). Finally, senior politicians are more likely to have serious international networks and close connections to national capitals.…”

Autonomy and international organisations

“…Overlapping authority requires an independent-minded unit or a strong organisational leader to persuade others of the merits of acting outside the delegation contract. As Hall and Woods ( 2018 : 873) note, the ability and willingness of IO staff members and executive heads to overcome constraints vary, depending on their personality, leadership style, skills, and risk propensity, and it is difficult to generalise about such factors. Thus, IO autonomy is less likely when decision-making authority within its bureaucratic agent is dispersed.…”

Recursive recognition in the international political economy

“…From this perspective the key players are actors who have decision-making autonomy and pronounce their interests. Individual actors are commonly conceived of as entrepreneurs pushing ideas (Blyth, 2002;Widmaier et al, 2007), policymakers strategizing to achieve the best win-set for their state (Bailer & Weiler, 2015), or executives steering their organizations (Hall & Woods, 2018). Viewing organizations as actors typically means a particular type of actor, such as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) or non-governmental organization (NGO), where the command and claim of authority is given by the organizational type.…”