“They've conspired against us”: Understanding the role of social identification and conspiracy beliefs in justification of ingroup collective behavior

Abstract

The present research investigates conditions under which beliefs in conspiracy theories predict the desire to justify ingroup behavior in the context of intergroup conflict. We propose that within the context of Ukraine's intergroup conflict over the annexation of Crimea, supporters (but not opponents) of the “Euromaidan” social movement are likely to validate protesters’ collective actions as just to the extent that they believe that the authorities are engaged in annexation‐related conspiracies. We also examine the moderating role of perceived political corruption in these processes. Using a public opinion survey of 315 Ukrainians, we found support for our hypothesized moderated mediation model—identification with “Euromaidan” increased beliefs in the annexation‐related conspiracy theories, which in turn, increased justification of protesters’ actions in the setting of intergroup conflict. However, this mediation was only observed among those supporters of the Euromaidan who perceived political corruption to be at a low or average level.

Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories

“…The relevance of mistrust to intergroup conspiracy theories becomes rather more complicated when examining diverse groups operating within larger societies. For example, contrary to expectations, mistrust of one's own government as measured by belief in political corruption has not been found to necessarily increase BCT about one's own ingroup (Chayinska & Minescu, 2018). Instead, it appears that "system identity threats" -fears that an ingroup society is coming undone -can increase BCT about the malevolent intentions of minority ingroup members through a self-protective mechanism (Jolley, Douglas, & Sutton, 2018).…”

“…The two-component, socio-epistemic model of BCT further hypothesizes that uncertainty and loss of control should be understood in relation to loss of trust in the institutions that are expected to keep people safe. This dynamic may have particular relevance to intergroup conspiracies that have been linked to both a need for control and a need to blame others (Chayinska & Minescu, 2018;Imhoff & Bruder, 2014;Kofta, Soral, & Bilewicz, 2020). Swami (2012, p. 7) found that within a Malaysian sample, belief in a conspiracy theory about Jews was not so much related to belief in other conspiracy theories or general conspiracist ideation as it was to "ideological needs"…”

Belief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain

“…While most research conducted thus far on this topic has taken place in Western societies (mostly the US and Western Europe), conspiracy theories are by no means exclusive to these societies. Quantitative research has found evidence for widespread conspiracy beliefs in countries around the world, including Poland (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, ), Ukraine (Chayinska & Minescu, ), Malaysia (Swami, ), Indonesia (Mashuri & Zaduqisti, ), and the Muslim world in the Middle East (Gentzkow & Shapiro, ). Ethnographic studies have found substantial conspiracy theorizing in rural Africa (e.g., Namibia; Tanzania) where people endorse a range of conspiracy theories that implicate societal elites, that accuse enemy tribes of witchcraft, or that involve malpractice of the Western world.…”

“…It should be noted, however, that not all consequences are necessarily negative. For instance, conspiracy theories can inspire and justify protest movements (Imhoff & Bruder, ; see also Chayinska, Minescu, & Colucci, ), and whether that is positive or negative depends on the type of social change that these movements pursue. Furthermore, conspiracy theories can increase governmental transparency (Clarke, ), and belief in conspiracy theories is associated with increased support for democratic principles (Swami et al., ).…”

‘We fight for a better future for our country’: Understanding the Ukrainian Euromaidan movement as the emergence of a social competition strategy

“…The results revealed that its emergence was preceded by participants’ anger over the government's decision to suspend the EU–Ukraine agreement and their general perception of untrustworthiness of the governing authorities (reflected by the negative effects of perceived fairness of the authorities). Whereas there is a considerable agreement within the literature on the mobilizing effects of group‐based anger (e.g., Stürmer & Simon, ; Tausch et al ., ; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, ; van Zomeren et al ., ) and allegations of corruption against an authority (e.g., Bou Zeineddine & Pratto, ; Chayinska & Minescu, ; Thomas & Louis, ), our study sheds light on the process by which the tendency to blame the system in untrustworthiness can also become a core binding factor in the formation of protest identities. An intriguing implication of this finding is that it reveals the interplay between the push‐and‐pull self‐categorical processes, appraisals of political conditions, and collective behaviours they afford.…”