Thinking about Mechanisms

Machamer, Peter; Darden, Lindley; Craver, Carl F.

doi:10.1086/392759

Cited by 2,335 publications

(1,594 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…4 Shortly after conception of mechanism, Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) (hereafter MDC) defended their own conception of mechanism:…”

Section: The New Mechanistic Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What we call the new mechanistic philosophy is comprised of two dominant conceptions of mechanism, one due to Glennan ( , 2002aGlennan ( , 2002b) and the other due to the team of Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000). The new mechanistic philosophy has the broad aim of building a philosophical framework for understanding the nature and role of mechanisms in science.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection

Skipper

Millstein

2005

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

119

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This paper explores whether natural selection, a putative evolutionary mechanism, and a main one at that, can be characterized on either of the two dominant conceptions of mechanism, due to Glennan and the team of Machamer, Darden, and Craver, that constitute the "new mechanistic philosophy." The results of the analysis are that neither of the dominant conceptions of mechanism adequately captures natural selection. Nevertheless, the new mechanistic philosophy possesses the resources for an understanding of natural selection under the rubric.

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“…4 Shortly after conception of mechanism, Machamer, Darden, and Craver (2000) (hereafter MDC) defended their own conception of mechanism:…”

Section: The New Mechanistic Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection

Skipper

Millstein

2005

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

119

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“…Instead of functional analysis, Functionalism 3.4 maintains that psychological explanation is mechanistic, that is, it is a decomposition of a system in terms of its components, their functional activities, and their organization [Bechtel & Richardson 2010], [Craver 2001], [Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000], [Piccinini & Craver 2011]. …”

Section: Functionalism 34mentioning

confidence: 99%

Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1

Maley¹,

Piccinini²

2013

philosophiascientiae

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Résumé : Le fonctionnalisme est une solution populaire au problème espritcorps. Il a un certain nombre de versions. Nous en exposons certaines parmi les principales, en énumérant une partie de leurs caractéristiques les plus importantes ainsi que certains « bugs » qui les ont entachées. Nous présentons comment les différentes variantes sont liées. Nombreux ont été les pessimistes à propos des perspectives du fonctionnalisme, mais la plupart des critiques ne tiennent pas compte des dernières mises à jour. Nous finissons en suggé-rant une variante du fonctionnalisme qui fournit une description complète de l'esprit.Abstract: Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind-body problem. It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of functionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related. Many have been pessimistic about functionalism's prospects, but most criticisms have missed the latest upgrades. We end by suggesting a version of functionalism that provides a complete account of the mind.The mind-body problem is the problem of how the mental relates to the physical. We know they are intimately involved: the physical affects the mental when our body is injured and we feel pain, or when we drink alcohol and feel intoxicated; the mental affects the physical when we decide to retrieve a book and reach for it, or when we perceive the signal to cross the street and begin walking. The first solution that comes to mind is dualism: the view that the mental and physical are two different kinds of thing. While dualism is intuitively appealing, it faces such serious difficulties (how to account for the intimate connections between the mental and the physical, how the mental and the physical could possibly interact, etc.) that it's been mostly abandoned. The other option is monism, according to which the mental and the physical

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“…Complete 16 See, for example, Wimsatt (1976);Brandon (1985Brandon ( , 1996; Woodward (1989Woodward ( , 2002; Glennan (1996Glennan ( , 2002; Salmon (1998); Thagard (1998) ;Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000); Craver (2001);Tabery (2004); this issue. 17 Machamer, Darden, & Craver (2000), p. 3.…”

Section: Mechanisms In Biologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive speciation: the role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation

Baker

2005

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in

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Recent discussion of mechanism has suggested new approaches to several issues in the philosophy of science, including theory structure, causal explanation, and reductionism. Here, I apply what I take to be the fruits of the Ônew mechanical philosophyÕ to an analysis of a contemporary debate in evolutionary biology about the role of natural selection in speciation. Traditional accounts of that debate focus on the geographic context of genetic divergencenamely, whether divergence in the absence of geographic isolation is possible (or significant). Those accounts are at best incomplete, I argue, because they ignore the mechanisms producing divergence and miss what is at stake in the biological debate. I argue that the biological debate instead concerns the scope of particular speciation mechanisms which assign different roles to natural selection at various stages of divergence. The upshot is a new interpretation of the crux of that debate-namely, whether divergence with gene flow is possible (or significant) and whether the isolating mechanisms producing it are adaptive.

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Thinking about Mechanisms

Cited by 2,335 publications

References 22 publications

Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection

Thinking about evolutionary mechanisms: natural selection

Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1

Adaptive speciation: the role of natural selection in mechanisms of geographic and non-geographic speciation

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