Third Party Mediation: An Obstacle to Peace in Nagorno Karabakh

Betts, Wendy

doi:10.1353/sais.1999.0027

Cited by 18 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Beyond impacting the costs and benefits faced by civil war parties, powerful third parties can also serve as guarantors of a potential settlement, further encouraging the acceptance of their offers of mediation (Betts 1999; Quinn et al. 2006; Walter 2002).…”

Section: The Acceptance Of Civil War Mediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

Greig

Regan

2008

International Studies Quarterly

142

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Facilitating peace settlements among parties to a civil war represents a key challenge for policymakers. In spite of the grave consequences and relatively high frequency of civil wars, we know little about how best to manage them. In this article we examine the linked questions of under what conditions third parties provide and warring parties accept offers of mediation in civil wars. Our analysis suggests that third-party offers are closely tied to the interests a third party has in a civil war state as well as the historical ties between the third party and civil war state. Importantly, we note critical distinctions between the conditions that encourage offers of mediation from those that foster its acceptance. The theoretical and policy implications of knowing when to offer and the conditions under which an offer will be accepted could have dramatic effects on civil war termination.

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Section: The Acceptance Of Civil War Mediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

Greig

Regan

2008

International Studies Quarterly

142

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“…A first factor influencing the use of the termination tactic has to do with the availability of alternative mediators or negotiation channels. In several instances of armed conflict, there seem to be an abundance of willing mediators (Betts, 1999; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). If there is a pool of potential mediators that all sides can agree to accept, the termination of activities by one particular mediator might not be seen as particularly hazardous for the continuation of the process (Betts, 1999: 176).…”

Section: Alternative Explanations and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In several instances of armed conflict, there seem to be an abundance of willing mediators (Betts, 1999; Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2004). If there is a pool of potential mediators that all sides can agree to accept, the termination of activities by one particular mediator might not be seen as particularly hazardous for the continuation of the process (Betts, 1999: 176). On the other hand, if the parties need a particular mediator, withdrawal would have disastrous consequences.…”

Section: Alternative Explanations and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka¹

Höglund

Svensson

2011

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

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What explains a mediator’s choice of tactic when faced with a situation of crisis? This article focuses on mediation in internal armed conflicts and on one particular mediation tactic: the use of the exit option as a means to pressure the parties to enter into negotiations and make concessions to end the war. We examine the conditions under which the exit option—here referred to as the termination tactic—is likely to be used. Utilizing a cost–benefit approach, we develop a theoretical framework for understanding when mediators will employ the termination tactic. The framework is applied to four crises in the Sri Lankan peace process (2000–2006), during which Norway acted as a mediator. The analysis indicates that the termination tactic is employed when mediators (a) expect few rewards from involvement in the process, (b) deem other tactics as being ineffective, and (c) perceive that the parties have incentives for mediation.

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“…19 If preferences diverge too much from reality and there is no enforcement mechanism for the settlement, however, we would expect settlements arising from identity-driven misperception to be short lived and prone to renegotiation and reneging. This may be related to evidence that negotiation contexts provided by mediation diminish in power as disputants move away from them, implying that successfully mediated disputes may be prone to reoccur in the long term (Betts 1999;Beardsley 2008).…”

Section: Identity and Mediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identity, bargaining, and third-party mediation

Block

Siegel

2011

Int. Theory

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This paper elucidates a theory of identity formation and applies it to the study of international negotiation. The theory acknowledges that actors/agents can adopt a multiplicity of identities, and it treats changes in the salience of identities as endogenous to the contextually dependent processes of interpersonal and intergroup interactions. Typically, strong identities are viewed as encouraging conflict and exacerbating interstate disputes. Our theory, however, suggests a palliative role for identity: third-party mediation can more effectively resolve conflicts when it enhances shared, if initially less salient, aspects of the disputants’ identities. We discuss several causal pathways through which the process of enhancing identity salience can increase the likelihood of successful conflict resolution, providing a complementary mechanism for the effectiveness of mediation to those extant in the literature. The paper concludes with a practical method for applying the theory's insights to the choice of mediator and the mediator's technique.

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Third Party Mediation: An Obstacle to Peace in Nagorno Karabakh

Cited by 18 publications

References 4 publications

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka¹

Identity, bargaining, and third-party mediation

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Third Party Mediation: An Obstacle to Peace in Nagorno Karabakh

Cited by 18 publications

References 4 publications

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka1

Identity, bargaining, and third-party mediation

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Should I Stay or Should I Go? Termination as a Tactic and Norwegian Mediation in Sri Lanka¹