When Do They Say Yes? An Analysis of the Willingness to Offer and Accept Mediation in Civil Wars

Abstract

Facilitating peace settlements among parties to a civil war represents a key challenge for policymakers. In spite of the grave consequences and relatively high frequency of civil wars, we know little about how best to manage them. In this article we examine the linked questions of under what conditions third parties provide and warring parties accept offers of mediation in civil wars. Our analysis suggests that third-party offers are closely tied to the interests a third party has in a civil war state as well as the historical ties between the third party and civil war state. Importantly, we note critical distinctions between the conditions that encourage offers of mediation from those that foster its acceptance. The theoretical and policy implications of knowing when to offer and the conditions under which an offer will be accepted could have dramatic effects on civil war termination.

Qui bono? Foreign military, economic, diplomatic interventions, and the termination of civil wars: An integrative approach

“…12 Overall, the results show that there is variation among conflicts in attracting different intervention types. More specifically, consistent with the literature (Clayton 2013;Clayton and Gleditsch 2014;Greig and Regan 2008;Melin and Svensson 2009), the likelihood of diplomatic interventions is increased during the post-Cold War era, in more extended conflicts, and as rebels get stronger in relation to government forces. Economic sanctions are more likely when wealthier countries get stranded in civil wars.…”

Your Reputation Precedes You: Ceasefires and Cooperative Credibility During Civil Conflict

“…2. Research focusing on conflict management efforts also reach similar conclusions (Greig and Regan 2008;Melin and Svensson 2009;Keels and Greig 2019). 3.…”

Costs and Cover: Explaining the Onset of Ceasefires in Civil Conflict

“…We therefore expect a non-linear relationship whereby a ceasefire is more likely in the initial months, following this the likelihood of a ceasefire is likely to decline until sufficient time has passed for a mutual recognition of the likely future cumulative costs and unlikelihood of military victory to become clear. This is akin to mediation, which has been shown to be more likely to be successful ‘early’ and ‘late’ in the duration of a conflict (Greig 2001; Greig and Regan 2008; Regan and Stam 2000).…”