Plato 1971
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-86201-6_6
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Thought and Desire in Plato

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Cited by 79 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…What I know and what I see stand in contradiction. Passion-according to the theory presented in Protagora-also includes an opinion on the desired subject, independent of rational knowledge and opened to perspective's misconception: closer pleasure appears as bigger and we have for it a stronger desire, even though we know that it is smaller than other pleasures which are deferred [15].…”
Section: Emotions In the Platonic Doctrine Of The Soulmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…What I know and what I see stand in contradiction. Passion-according to the theory presented in Protagora-also includes an opinion on the desired subject, independent of rational knowledge and opened to perspective's misconception: closer pleasure appears as bigger and we have for it a stronger desire, even though we know that it is smaller than other pleasures which are deferred [15].…”
Section: Emotions In the Platonic Doctrine Of The Soulmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nussbaum (1986, p. 205) hace una interpretación parecida: "appetites are merely brute forces reaching, insatiably and without any selectivity, each for a characteristic object" [los apetitos son fuerzas brutas que intentan alcanzar, insaciablemente y sin ninguna selectividad, cada una un objeto característico], aunque según lo que dice en p. 139, n. 5, parece inclinarse por posiciones como las de Irwin (1995, pp. 218-222) y Penner (1971). Véanse aquí las nn.…”
Section: 3 Las Tres Partes Del Alma Según El Esquema Hidráulicounclassified
“…The primary evidence for the view that the desires arising from the appetitive part of the soul are independent of our beliefs about value comes from Republic iv, where Socrates attempts to distinguish appetites from other sorts of desires by claiming that they are solely for their object (437d-e); he proceeds to say that we should not be dissuaded from this claim by the view that everyone desires ( §piymoËsin) good things (t«n égay«n, 438a). Some commentators have taken this to be a direct repudiation of the view that all desires are for what we believe to be good (see, e.g., Irwin 1995, 209;Penner 1971Penner , 1990and Reeve 1988, 134-135). This passage, however, hardly provides conclusive claim in Republic vi (again, highly reminiscent of the Protagoras) that every soul pursues (di≈kei) the good and does everything it does for its sake (505d11-e1).…”
Section: Moral Psychology In the Protagoras And The Republicmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These commentators have not, however, given a clear and explicit account of the nature of an irrational desire, but have 2 See, e.g., Frede 1992, xxix-xxx;Irwin 1977, 78, and1995, 209;Penner 1990Penner , 1996Penner , 1997Reshotko 1992. 3 Irwin 1995Penner 1971Penner , 1990and Reeve 1988, 134-135 also argue that the moral psychology of the Republic differs from that of the Protagoras in so far as the Republic acknowledges the existence of irrational desires.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%