Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence

Abstract

An understanding of the causes of political repression has continually eluded researchers for the past decade. We argue that much of this can be tied to the theoretical specifications of the models employed. We developed a decision-theoretic model that predicts the level of repression used by governments to suppress political opposition. We believe that analysis of repression needs to include the political contexts in which states operate. In particular, we theorize and find that the nature of the threat posed by an opposition group influences the impact of both the domestic and international factors on the government's decision to repress. We argue that the international and domestic costs associated with a given level of government repression are best represented by separate, non-linear functions of the level of demand made by a dissident opposition group. From this model we deduce an equilibrium level of repression for any given demand; we then empirically test these predictions against original data generated from 18 Latin American countries during the years 1977-86. We find that as the nature of the threat posed by an opposition group moves from minor to extreme, the marginal increment of government repression decreases. Analyses of these data support our theoretical propositions, and suggest that both non-linear approaches and the inclusion of opposition group demands provide a useful tool for studying state repression.

The Puzzle of Abu Ghraib: Are Democratic Institutions a Palliative or Panacea?

“…Within this work, authoritarian political systems compelled political leaders to use coercion in order to proactively eliminate challengers, create ideal citizens and/or transform political, economic and cultural systems. Later theories employed what can best be thought of as a structuralist-rationalist hybrid (e.g., Gartner and Regan 1996, Gurr 1986, Lichbach 1987, Stohl 1983, Wantchekon and Healy 1999. This work argues that political authorities engage in a decision calculus where they assess the costs, benefits, probability of success, and existing alternatives to coercion before deciding whether or not and at what level to use state repression.…”

The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations

“…Existing research has linked the variation in repression to institutional, economic, and demographic structures, to the level of threat posed by the opposition, and, through democracy, to accountability and the likelihood of withdrawal of public support (Cingranelli and Richards 1999;Davenport 2007;Davenport and Armstrong 2004;Gartner and Regan 1996;Landman 2005;Poe and Tate 1994). Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Cherif (2005:439) emphasize accountability in explaining the greater respect for human rights shown by democracies: "accountability appears to be the critical feature that makes full-fledged democracies respect human rights; limited accountability generally retards improvements in human rights."…”

De FactoJudicial Independence and Physical Integrity Rights

“…Three main views seek to explain variations in government protections of their citizens' human rights. One approach emphasizes the role of threats to the regime as stimuli of repression (Gurr 1986;Poe and Tate 1994;Davenport 1995Davenport , 1996Gartner and Regan 1996;Poe et al 1999;Bueno De Mesquita et al 2003;Poe 2004). Another perspective explains repression as the result of state characteristics-mainly the level of democracy in a society (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1988;Poe and Tate 1994;Fein 1995;Davenport 1996;Poe et al 1999;Regan and Henderson 2002;Davenport and Armstrong 2004) or its degree of economic development (Mitchell and McCormick 1988;Poe and Tate 1994;Poe et al 1999;Zanger 2000;Hathaway 2002).…”