Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China

Li, Yitan; Drury, A. Cooper

doi:10.1111/j.1528-3577.2004.00185.x

Cited by 23 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Moreover, sanctions frequently impose significant economic and social costs on civilians Lopez 2000, 2002;Weiss 1999;Weiss et al 1997). They may also contribute to adverse changes in the domestic political climate and policy decisions of the target state (Drury and Li 2006;Kaempfer, Lowenberg, and Mertens 2004;Li and Drury 2004). Given that improving human rights is often a stated objective of economic sanctions, particularly those imposed by Western states, the human rights impact of sanctions is an important issue of policy.…”

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confidence: 99%

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

Wood

2008

International Studies Quarterly

242

164

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While intended as a nonviolent foreign policy alternative to military intervention, sanctions have often worsened humanitarian and human rights conditions in the target country. This article examines the relationship between economic sanctions and state‐sponsored repression of human rights. Drawing on both the public choice and institutional constraints literature, I argue that the imposition of economic sanctions negatively impacts human rights conditions in the target state by encouraging incumbents to increase repression. Specifically, sanctions threaten the stability of target incumbents, leading them to augment their level of repression in an effort to stabilize the regime, protect core supporters, minimize the threat posed by potential challengers, and suppress popular dissent. The empirical results support this theory. These findings provide further evidence that sanctions impose political, social, and physical hardship on civilian populations. They also underscore a need for improvements in current strategies and mechanisms by which states pursue foreign‐policy goals and the international community enforces international law and stability.

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confidence: 99%

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

Wood

2008

International Studies Quarterly

242

164

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“…Together with the theoretical model, the empirical results suggest some policy insights, such as the possible reasons for failure of such policies as humanitarian military intervention or economic sanctions at improving human rights practices (Li & Drury, 2004;Peksen, 2012). Both of these policies impose or demand a change in domestic type (e.g.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Dangerous liaisons

Chyzh

2016

Journal of Peace Research

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This article applies recent advances in network analysis to highlight a central tension faced by policymakersbalancing the benefits of engaging with the international system and the associated domestic policy costs. International trade rewards certain domestic practices, such as respect for human rights. Enforcing such practices, however, is politically costly and sometimes prohibitive to state leaders who rely on political repression to stay in power. In such cases, domestic elites often resort to an alternative strategy of securing the benefits of international tradesetting up indirect trade channels through intermediary states. These competing incentives are modeled within a single framework using a formal network game in which states form trade-links (direct or indirect) with other states, while simultaneously choosing their optimal level of domestic human rights protections. The model suggests that there may be an inverse relationship between a state's embeddedness within a network of indirect trade and respect for human rights: indirect trade channels serve as loopholes that allow domestically troubled states to enjoy the benefits of trade without pressure for domestic improvement. The predictions are supported by the results of the empirical analyses of the international trade and repression data (1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000), conducted using a coevolutionary actor-oriented longitudinal-network model -a statistical estimator that closely mimics the theoretical model.

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“…For Beijing to comply, even with trivial accommodations, meant that it was publicly bowing to U.S. pressure. Thus, China had a disincentive to offer any positive behavior to the U.S. (Li and Drury 2004).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, we attempt to provide an analysis of economic sanction threats. To accomplish this, we build on previous qualitative work (Li and Drury 2004) to evaluate quantitatively the U.S. decision to renew most favored nation (MFN) status for the People's Republic of China from 1989 to 1995. During this period, the U.S. contentiously debated to revoke, or renew with serious conditions, China's trading status.…”

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confidence: 99%

“… 14 In addition to the three factors we specify above, outcome is also determined by the target's preference vis‐à‐vis the demand (Baldwin 1971; Chan 2000). See Chan (2000) and Li and Drury (2004) for a qualitative evaluation of the effectiveness of the MFN threats. Wang (1993) makes a somewhat counter argument for the effectiveness, although across more issues than just human rights. …”

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confidence: 99%

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U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights

Drury

2006

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Recent literature argues that economic sanction threats should be more successful because both sender and target have an incentive to resolve their dispute before entering into costly sanction. Testing this assertion is somewhat problematic because threats are essentially nonevents Fsanctions that were never deployed. This paper quantifies the U.S. threats to condition or revoke China's most favored nation status and shows that Washington's threats were not only ineffective but also coun-terproductiveFChinese accommodations decreased when the U.S. made acute threats but increased when Washington was cooperative. We conclude that for highly salient issues, sanction threats tend to be ineffective.Authors' note: We are indebted to

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Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China

Cited by 23 publications

References 33 publications

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

“A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation”: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001

Dangerous liaisons

U.S. Economic Sanction Threats Against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights

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