2012 International Conference on Computer Communication and Informatics 2012
DOI: 10.1109/iccci.2012.6158832
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Threats and vulnerabilities on TCP/OBS networks

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Cited by 10 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…By encrypting data bursts at the ingress edge router and decrypting at the egress edge router the data bursts switch transparently across the OBS core routers, so the end-to-end burst confidentiality within the OBS domain is provided [ 8 ]. In this OBS technique, when a burst is passed from ingress node to egress node through many intermediate core nodes, it can be possibly stolen by the attacker nodes [ 9 ]. How the attacker nodes use the various methods to steal the burst and how we can prevent this from happening are discussed below.…”
Section: End-to-end Data Burst Confidentialitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By encrypting data bursts at the ingress edge router and decrypting at the egress edge router the data bursts switch transparently across the OBS core routers, so the end-to-end burst confidentiality within the OBS domain is provided [ 8 ]. In this OBS technique, when a burst is passed from ingress node to egress node through many intermediate core nodes, it can be possibly stolen by the attacker nodes [ 9 ]. How the attacker nodes use the various methods to steal the burst and how we can prevent this from happening are discussed below.…”
Section: End-to-end Data Burst Confidentialitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the BHP flooding attack, malicious nodes send a large number of BHPs to the network which affect the bandwidth utilization [7,8]. These BHPs take over the core switch and maliciously occupy the idle wavelength division multiplexing channels, making it impossible for normal BHPs to transmit.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As a result, this target node is unable to transmit legitimate BHPs and discards the upcoming legitimate BHPs, in which reserved channel resources are wasted. In extreme cases, these attacks can also lead to a serious denial of service [7]. As OBS networks have been intensively studied, their network security has also received much attention.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…is function can be exploited by attackers to send fake BHPs without DB acknowledgment. Such fake BHPs can affect the network and reduce its performance through decreasing bandwidth utilization and increasing data loss, leading to a denial of service (DoS) attack [3], which is one of the most crucial security threats to networks.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%