Three kinds of reliabilism

Hofmann, Frank

doi:10.1080/13869795.2013.738305

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…En realidad, las concepciones contemporáneas del conocimiento a priori no asignan ya este rasgo de infalibilidad y la mayoría de las epistemologías contemporáneas manifiestan ser falibilistas (Hetherington, 2005). La cuestión es si hay alguna relación entre el carácter falibilista o no de la concepción del conocimiento y el que se postule la posibilidad del conocimiento básico a priori 22 .…”

Section: Justificación Epistémica "En Sentido Débil"unclassified

El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico

García-Arnaldos

2019

An. Semin. Hist. Filos.

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El objeto de este artículo es analizar el problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico y ofrecer una solución basada en un tipo de justificación deflacionaria no-evidencialista a partir de la noción de habilitación (entitlement) de T. Burge y la de garantía racional de C. Wright. El problema, en el caso del conocimiento básico lógico, es que justificar las reglas lógicas inferencialmente supone utilizar principios lógicos, con lo cual se genera un círculo vicioso. Examinamos la viabilidad del enfoque no-inferencialista de Wright y sostendremos que una garantía racional es una respuesta viable para el problema de la justificación del conocimiento lógico básico.

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Section: Justificación Epistémica "En Sentido Débil"unclassified

El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico

García-Arnaldos

2019

An. Semin. Hist. Filos.

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“…6For some central problems of reliabilism, such as the generality problem and problems surrounding defeaters, see, for example, Goldman (2008) and Hofmann (2013a). …”

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“…12Below I will spell out in more detail what is meant by ‘evidence’ and what the ‘appropriate link’ to evidence is. For more on reasons and evidence see, for example, Hofmann (2013a). Pryor distinguishes various concepts of ‘justification’.…”

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Gettier for Justification

Hofmann

2014

Episteme

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I will present a problem for any externalist evidentialism that allows for accidental possession of evidence. There are Gettier cases for justication. I will describe two such cases -cases involving veridical hallucination. An analysis of the cases is given, along the lines of (reliabilist) virtue epistemology (cf. Sosa, Greco). The cases show that certain externalist evidentialist accounts of justication do not provide sufcient conditions. The reason lies in the fact that one can be luckily in possession of evidence, and then one will not have a justied belief. Justied belief requires an anti-luck condition on possession of evidence. This opens up the prospects of a unied virtue-epistemology covering both knowledge and justication.

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“…2The arguments in this paper could be recast to suit other versions of reliabilism, I believe, such as what Hofmann (2013) calls ‘reasons reliabilism’. However, the recasting of the arguments will be cumbersome, and process reliabilism is the paradigmatic form of reliabilism, so it is the process reliabilist defense of epistemically circular arguments that I consider here.…”

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Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure

Bondy¹

2014

Episteme

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Epistemically circular arguments have been receiving quite a bit of attention in the literature for the past decade or so. Often the goal is to determine whether reliabilists (or other foundationalists) are committed to the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. It is often assumed that epistemic circularity is objectionable, though sometimes reliabilists accept that their position entails the legitimacy of some epistemically circular arguments, and then go on to affirm that such arguments really are good ones. My goal in this paper is to argue against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments. My strategy is to give an argument against the legitimacy of epistemically circular arguments, which rests on a principle of basis-relative safety, and then to argue that reliabilists do not have the resources to resist the argument. I argue that even if the premises of an epistemically circular argument enjoy reliabilist justification, the argument does not transmit that justification to its conclusion. The main goal of my argument is to show that epistemic circularity is always a bad thing, but it also has the positive consequence that reliabilists are freed from an awkward commitment to the legitimacy of some intuitively bad arguments.

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Three kinds of reliabilism

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico

El problema de la justificación del conocimiento básico

Gettier for Justification

Epistemic Circularity, Reliabilism, and Transmission Failure

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