Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance

Meacham, Christopher J. G.

doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00063.x

Cited by 27 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Such an approach has been suggested by Lewis [1994], Hall [1994] and Thau [1994]. Strevens [1995] and Meacham [2005] make similar proposals. The basic idea is that we can eliminate the need for any substantive theory of admissibility by recognizing that a believer should align her credences with known chances only when these chances incorporate all the information the believer possesses.…”

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confidence: 77%

The Development of Subjective Bayesianism

Joyce¹

2011

Handbook of the History of Logic

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The Bayesian approach to inductive reasoning originated in two brilliant insights. In 1654 Blaise Pascal, while in the course of a correspondence with Fermat [1769], recognized that states of uncertainty can be quantified using probabilities and expectations. In the early 1760s Thomas Bayes [1763] first understood that learning can be represented probabilistically using what is now called Bayes's Theorem. These ideas serve as the basis for all Bayesian thought.

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confidence: 77%

The Development of Subjective Bayesianism

Joyce¹

2011

Handbook of the History of Logic

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“…50 Of course, it's contentious whether ordinary coin tosses are chancy (see Lewis (1986)). And among those who think they are chancy, it is contentious whether these chances should be thought of as time-dependent (see Meacham (2005), Hoefer (2007). To get around these worries, we could replace the coin toss with the spin measurement of an electron, given an indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics like GRW.…”

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confidence: 99%

Impermissive Bayesianism

Meacham

2013

Erkenn

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This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White's (2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White's (2005) arguments against permissive views do not succeed.

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“…But the notion of admissibility employed by Lewis's first principle cannot be the notion of admissibility employed here, since that notion is of no help in resolving the Conflicts Problem-one can derive the same conflicting prescriptions in type 4 divergences using Lewis's first formulation of the Principal Principle, admissibility clause and all. 32 There are various ways to spell out why the Lewis's second formulation of the Principal Principle and the New Principle don't require an admissibility clause; for example, see Hall (1994), Arntzenius (1995), Hall (2004), Meacham (2005), Nelson (2009) andMeacham (2010). One can see what follows as excerpts from these discussions.…”

Section: Modifying the Chance-credence Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…We can think of the constraints the Principal Principle imposes as telling us how our priors in these large T Ks should be divided among the smaller T Ks it contains (see Meacham (2005)). This constraint leaves two things open: how our prior in all possibilities should get divided up among the large T Ks, and how our prior in the smallest T Ks should get divided up among individual worlds.…”

Section: Modifying the Chance-credence Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem

Meacham¹

2014

Chance and Temporal Asymmetry

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Forthcoming in Asymmetries in Chance and Time, ed. Handfield and Wilson. AbstractIn recent work, Cohen (2009) andHoefer (2007) have proposed variants of the account of chance proposed by Lewis (1994). One of the ways in which these accounts diverge from Lewis's is that they allow special sciences and the macroscopic realm to have chances that are autonomous from those of physics and the microscopic realm. A worry for these proposals is that autonomous chances may place incompatible constraints on rational belief. I examine this worry, and attempt to determine (i) what kinds of conflicts would be problematic, and (ii) whether these proposals lead to problematic conflicts. After working through a pair of cases, I conclude that these proposals do give rise to problematic conflicts.

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Three Proposals Regarding a Theory of Chance

Cited by 27 publications

References 19 publications

The Development of Subjective Bayesianism

The Development of Subjective Bayesianism

Impermissive Bayesianism

Autonomous Chances and the Conflicts Problem

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