Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice

The political economy of regional integration projects at borders where poor and rich meet: The role of cross-border shopping and community sorting

“…This decision structure captures the fact that individuals are simply born into one of the regions and that a region's native population has a 'head start' regarding local policy choices. For an alternative timing in which location choices are made before the regions go to the polls, see, for instance, Kessler and Lülfesmann (2005). 6 See the examples on cross-border local public transport in the twin cities Słubice-Frankfurt (Oder) and Zgorzelec-Görlitz mentioned in the introduction.…”

“…on border region residents' characteristics. In analysing these issues, our paper contributes to the literature on household mobility, public expenditures, and voting (see, e.g., Epple et al, 1984Epple et al, , 1993Hansen and Kessler, 2001;Kessler and Lülfesmann, 2005;Westhoff, 1979). These papers explore how different household types sort into communities when local voters decide on local expenditures, on public goods, or on redistribution.…”

Economic Fundamentals and Urban-Suburban Disparities

“…Our framework also highlights the importance of environmental amenities and the economy of scale in the provision of public services as determinants of urban spatial structure. Most previous studies of local jurisdictions either assume a constant‐return‐to‐scale production technology of public services (e.g., Kessler and Lülfesmann, 2005) or a lump‐sum transfer of tax revenue from jurisdictions to their residents (e.g., Epple and Romer, 1991).…”

LOCAL AMENITIES AND RENTS: TIEBOUT TAKES A VACATION*[link]

“…Without extractable rents, the only stable equilibria in most models are those in which residents are stratified by income across communities. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) demonstrate that only separating equilibria will be stable in a model with identical preferences, while most recently, Kessler and Lulfesmann (2005) show that pooling equilibria will not be stable even in models where voters have differing preferences for local public goods.…”