Tigers at Critical Junctures: How South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore Survived Growth-Led Conflicts

Abstract

Early studies on the developmental state examined the characteristics of East Asian economies that, despite deviating from the conventional free-market model, succeeded in catching up with the developed world within a few decades after the Second World War. The general consensus is that developmental states are those that possessed: a centralized state structure; effective and autonomous bureaucracy; and a close and productive relationship between states and industries (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995). Most states in the developing world do not share such characteristics and are thereby incapable of achieving economic performance of the East Asian calibre (see Evans and Rauch 1999). However, an agenda following this strand of studies is clear: enhancing state capacity is key to sustaining long-term economic growth. Although the developmental state literature provides us with an alternative set of development model and policy choices, it understates one critical aspect of the catchup process, that is, conflict. Take Thailand, Brazil and Turkey, for example. These three countries were promising economies in their respective regions and were on the verge of reaching a high-income level following East Asian tigers-if they maintained their growth momentum for another decade or so. Thailand was once the world's fastest-growing economy between 1987 and 1996, with the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita at 9.5%. Brazil flourished during the Lula presidency (2003-10), with its praiseworthy attempts to maintain macroeconomic stability and to reduce inequality through effective social policies. Turkey was a thriving uppermiddle-income country in the early 2000s when its poverty headcount ratio halved within a decade.

Applying Evolutionary Economic Geography beyond case studies in the Global North: Regional diversification in Vietnam

“…Furthermore, the analysis revealed that the presence of SOEs facilitated new industry entries in Vietnamese regions in the second period. This indicates that SOEs have the potential to be used as a developmental tool to accelerate structural change as has also been shown in other catch‐up contexts, such as China (Zhu et al ., 2019) or Singapore, where key industries were developed with the aid of SOEs a few decades ago (Kanchoochat, 2019). From a conceptual viewpoint, this result echoes the need to take multiple actors into account when analysing regional diversification and path creation (Hassink et al ., 2019).…”

Thailand Trapped: Catch-up Legacies and Contemporary Malaise

“…Even among first-tier newly industrialising economies, divergent catch-up strategies significantly impact their development trajectories. For example, in South Korea, a chaebol-led growth strategy led the country to higher inequality and more contentious democratisation compared to Taiwan, which strongly supported small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and state-owned enterprises (Jeon 1995; Veerayooth 2017). Theoretically, this is a question about path dependence or how “the trajectory of change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that point” (Hay 2006: 64–65).…”

“…Consequently, there were not enough Members of Parliament to convene a new Parliament. This political tumult paved the way for the military coup on 22 May 2014 (see Veerayooth and Hewison 2017).…”