Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential)

Abstract

The recordable cerebral activity (readiness-potential, RP) that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act was directly compared with the reportable time (W) for appearance of the subjective experience of 'wanting' or intending to act. The onset of cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act. This relationship held even for those series (with 'type II' RPs) in which subjects reported that all of the 40 self-initiated movements in the series appeared 'spontaneously' and capriciously. Data were obtained in at least 6 different experimental sessions with each of 5 subjects. In series with type II RPs, onset of the main negative shift in each RP preceded the corresponding mean W value by an average of about 350 ms, and by a minimum of about 150 ms. In series with type I RPs, in which an experience of preplanning occurred in some of the 40 self-initiated acts, onset of RP preceded W by an average of about 800 ms (or by 500 ms, taking onset of RP at 90 per cent of its area). Reports of W time depended upon the subject's recall of the spatial 'clock-position' of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of wanting or intending to move. Two different modes of recall produced similar values. Subjects distinguished awareness of wanting to move (W) from awareness of actually moving (M). W times were consistently and substantially negative to, in advance of, mean times reported for M and also those for S, the sensation elicited by a task-related skin stimulus delivered at irregular times that were unknown to the subject. It is concluded that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a 'decision' to act has already been initiated cerebrally. This introduces certain constraints on the potentiality for conscious initiation and control of voluntary acts.

Agency in Mid-air Interfaces

“…One example of supportive evidence of the predictive model is the work of Benjamin Libet [30], who studied the timeline regarding brain neural activity and the conscious experience of executing a motor movement. His results suggest that the intention of movement is generated by a brain process over which we have no control, as at that moment we are not consciously aware.…”

SEAI: Social Emotional Artificial Intelligence Based on Damasio’s Theory of Mind

“…(10) Finally, the bodily state induced by the events is upgraded as a new set of internal stimuli, and the actions of the agent lead to a modification of the social environment that is interpreted as a new set of external stimuli. An execution cycle from 0 to 10 lasts 0.33 ms, which is in line with the physiological time needed for passing from an intention to an action (Libet et al, 1983 As can be noticed, there are entire rule sets that are sole property of a module (e.g., SOMARS) and rules of the same rule set that appear in different modules (e.g., EMORS and REARS). In fact, different modules may include rules with similar function, connecting the same templates, or having the same priority.…”

Responsabilidade moral depois da neurociência

“…Libet's experiments (Libet et al, 1983) are probably the most well-known neuroscientific experiment among philosophers. They were based on electroencephalogram (EEG) readings, which record the subject´s brain activity through electrodes fixated in their scalp.…”