Time, Tense, and Causation

Abstract

Defends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones. The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not. Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority. The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections. It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.

Spacetime as a causal set: Universe as a growing block?

“…As already noted, a similar view, but with significant differences, 6 has been articulated recently by Tooley (1997). According to Tooley, the events in the world are connected via an asymmetric causal relation, with the causes producing their effects by "giving birth" to them, by "bringing them into existence".…”

“…In fact, the CSP promises to support a dynamic conception of time in a growing block model of the universe, similar in basic principle to the one championed by Charlie Dunbar Broad (1923) or the one defended by Michael Tooley (1997). According to this conception, referred to in the literature under the rubric past-presentism or possibilism (Savitt 2014), the totality of the existent state of affairs depends on time and at each time all past and present objects, events, etc.…”

There's no time like the present

“…Tooley 1997). No-futurists therefore believe that the present moment is privileged in being the last moment of time.…”

No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

“…Here is an intermediate position: no-futurism (also called the growing block view). According to this theory, past and present entities exist whereas future entities do not (see Broad 1923, Tooley 1997, Button 2006, 2007. This theory seems attractive because it allows for the truth-making of past-tensed statements while accounting for the openness of the future, given that there are no truth-makers for future-tensed statements.…”