To Be F Is To Be G

Dorr, Cian

doi:10.1111/phpe.12079

Cited by 151 publications

(93 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Our take on generalized identity builds on—yet in certain key respects deviates from—frameworks put forward by Correia (; ), Rayo (), and Dorr (). Space limitations preclude a full development and comparison, so we concentrate only on those elements of the resulting theory most relevant for later purposes.…”

Section: Generalized Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But such differences no more undermine a generalized identity than those between “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” undermine the truth of “Hesperus = Phosphorus” (cf. Dorr , pp. 42‐6; Rayo , pp.…”

Section: Generalized Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Familiar Russellian reasoning demonstrates that there is no such property being a non‐self‐instantiator , raising obvious trouble for the view that (4) expresses an identity involving it (Correia , pp. 761‐2; Dorr , p. 40)…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…“For the Atlantic Ocean to be filled with water” in (3), e.g., doesn't seem to be in the designating business, and the truth of (3) doesn't seem to hinge upon its being so. Surely we should believe (3), a mundane chemical‐geological truth, even if metaphysical inquiry reveals no ‘fact‐shaped’ entities with just the right individuation conditions (Cameron , p. 431; Dorr , pp. 40‐1; Rayo , pp.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Grounding, Essence, and Identity

Correia

Skiles

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are-as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree-widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine.Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are-as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree-widely thought to be intimately related:grounding (when some phenomenon non-causally 'derives' from another) and essence (when some phenomenon is in the 'nature' of another). However, how they're related remains quite opaque. 1 We aim to clarify their link by proposing a unified and uniform account of both notions that analyzes them in terms of a third: what we call, following Linnebo (2014), generalized identity. Along with the intrinsic desirability of accounting for either notion alone (which has proven elusive), our proposal illuminates how the two interact by means of a single, relatively wellbehaved conceptual tool.What do we mean by "generalized" identity? Objectual identities (e.g. "Hesperus is Phosphorus") are familiar, and display a canonical form: an identity-indicating * This article is the product of full and equal collaboration between its authors; the order of authorship is alphabetical.

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Section: Generalized Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Generalized Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Grounding, Essence, and Identity

Correia

Skiles

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Statements of this form can also be understood as what has variously been called ‘generalised identities’ (Linnebo , Correia & Skiles ms ), ‘identifications’ (Dorr ) or ‘‘just is’‐statements’ (Rayo ). Since generalised identities (this is the label I will use) are going to play a central role in the discussion, I shall mark the difference between the two kinds of statements by means of syntactic decorations: To be F is def to be G will be used for real definitions, and To be F is id to be G for generalised identities.…”

Section: Real Definitions and Generalised Identitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real Definitions

Correia

2017

Philosophical Issues

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I offer and defend an account of real definitions. I put forward two versions of the account, one formulated in terms of the notion of generalised identity and of a suitable notion of grounding (RD1), and the other one formulated in terms of the former notion and of a suitable notion of comparative joint‐carvingness (RD2). Given a plausible assumption, (RD1) and (RD2) turn out to be equivalent. I give a sketch of a unified account of the three notions involved in (RD1) and (RD2) from which the assumption can be derived.

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Metametaphysics and semantics

Williamson¹

2023

Examining Philosophy Itself

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To Be F Is To Be G

Cited by 151 publications

References 52 publications

Grounding, Essence, and Identity

Grounding, Essence, and Identity

Real Definitions

Metametaphysics and semantics

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