2015
DOI: 10.1080/13600826.2015.1093464
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To Intervene in Darfur, or Not: Re-examining the R2P Debate and Its Impact

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Cited by 8 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…5 Yet the idea that adopting the ‘right’ sort of news framing can trigger such armed intervention by placing ‘clear legal duties on Western states … to take preventive action’ (Kent, 2006: 8) is doubtful. It is noteworthy that in the case of Darfur the use of ‘genocide’ framing had no such effect, contrary to the expectations of activists who ‘pressured the US government to “call Darfur by its rightful name”: genocide’ (Verhoeven et al, 2016: 25). In 2004, both houses of the US Congress declared that genocide was happening in Darfur, as did then Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W Bush.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…5 Yet the idea that adopting the ‘right’ sort of news framing can trigger such armed intervention by placing ‘clear legal duties on Western states … to take preventive action’ (Kent, 2006: 8) is doubtful. It is noteworthy that in the case of Darfur the use of ‘genocide’ framing had no such effect, contrary to the expectations of activists who ‘pressured the US government to “call Darfur by its rightful name”: genocide’ (Verhoeven et al, 2016: 25). In 2004, both houses of the US Congress declared that genocide was happening in Darfur, as did then Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W Bush.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 93%
“…O solidarismo se contrapõe ao pluralismo, que defende a ordem como predominante e privilegia a soberania e a não-intervenção em detrimento aos direitos humanos. 2004, 28;Lechner 2010, 437;Verhoeven, de Oliveira, and Jaganathan 2015). Assim, qualquer discussão sobre intervenções internacionais deve definir suas bases norteadoras, dada as motivações que orientam tal ação 5 .…”
Section: Um Breve Olhar Sobre a Evolução Das Intervenções Humanitáriasunclassified
“…This policy ambivalence explains why the US was quick to call Darfur "genocide," but at the same time rule out even the potential of a NATO mission. Making matters worse, the US kept urging the AU to lead in Darfur while simultaneously attacking the quality of African initiatives (Verhoeven et al 2016). In this way, the US could maintain some semblance of its normative image, as related to the protection of innocents, without contributing to a mission that appeared both difficult and unsupported by other robust Western institutions.…”
Section: Standard Explanations Of Non-intervention: Interest In the Smentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The lessons of Rwanda also haunted UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had been the head of peacekeeping operations at the time of the 1994 genocide and was blamed for the UN's grave failure to act. On the 10 th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, Annan brought the matter of Darfur before the UN Human Rights Commission, endorsing a broader policy of civilian protection and possible interventionist measures against genocide (Verhoeven et al 2016).…”
Section: Early Warnings Of Genocidementioning
confidence: 99%
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