2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) 2016
DOI: 10.1109/cdc.2016.7799079
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To observe or not to observe: Queuing game framework for urban parking

Abstract: Abstract-We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash) equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as utility maximizers and consider the game in which observing the queue length is free as well as the game in which drivers must pay to observe the queue length. In both games, drivers must decide between balking and joining. We compare the Nash induced welfare to the socially … Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…The above equation symbolizes the induction condition as described in (43). Applying the inductive hypothesis recursively to instances I 1 , I 1 , and using the same reasoning as before, we conclude that for every s-t path p ∈ P, y θ1 p ≤ y 1 p .…”
Section: A Proof Of Lemmamentioning
confidence: 78%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The above equation symbolizes the induction condition as described in (43). Applying the inductive hypothesis recursively to instances I 1 , I 1 , and using the same reasoning as before, we conclude that for every s-t path p ∈ P, y θ1 p ≤ y 1 p .…”
Section: A Proof Of Lemmamentioning
confidence: 78%
“…This question is of considerable interest in a number of settings. For example, in urban transportation networks, the uncertainty about where a driver can find available street parking can often cascade into increased congestion for other drivers leading to a detrimental effect on the overall congestion cost [38], [41]- [43].…”
Section: B Impact Of Uncertain Users On Users Without Uncertaintymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7b, farthest west red block-face along the waterfront in Fig. 10), 2) block-face 185 is on the boundary of an isolated section 6 See github.com/cpatdowling/net-queue/data/ simulation/belltownsims/belltowndata/data_notes.txt for additional information Fig. 10: Locations of average occupancy error between data and simulation across weekdays, March -June 2016 Fig.…”
Section: Monte Carlo Simulation Of Rate Parametersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further, in transportation literature, cruising for parking also results from drivers searching for an available curbside parking space to avoid garage prices [4]. In the aggregate this behavior creates potentially significant congestion [5], but city planners have until recently lacked high resolution (block-face by blockface, per hour) models of such costs [6]. Congestion caused by drivers cruising for parking is non-trivial, historically cited as composing up to 30% of through-traffic [7], [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Occupancy and other data lend themselves to discrete and probabilistic models that may potentially better reflect flow on surface streets as compared to flow on highways or through spatially homogeneous regions, as in [Arnott, 2006] and [Arnott and Rowse, 2009]. Hence, classical methods of queueing theory have recently been applied to parking areas: garage and curbside alike [Ratliff et al, 2016, Larson and Sasanuma, 2010, Caliskan et al, 2007, Ceballos and Curtis, 2004.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%