To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity

Abstract

Though many scholars study the formation of policy, less attention is given to its endurance. In this article, I seek to determine what contributes to the longevity of policy by examining the case of presidential unilateralism. While scholars widely recognize presidents' ability to unilaterally make policy with executive orders, they largely do not account for how these same orders can be easily changed by subsequent administrations. To address this deficiency, I develop a theory of executive order duration based on both time-invariant characteristics of the order and time-variant changes in the political climate it faces. Using survival analysis to examine all orders revoked between 1937 and 2013, I find support for the theory. This study has implications for understanding the endurance of executive orders and other policy instruments as part of the law as well as understanding the strategic actions of policy makers given the transient nature of these tools.

Trump, trans students and transnational progress

“…Recent US executive orders affecting trans students have had local and transnational impacts. However the former Obama Administration's positive trans student policy initiatives between 1997 and 2013 have lacked durability (Thrower 2017). That both President Obama and President Trump have used their executive powers to influence the lives of trans people rather than other groups is significant.…”

Policy Durability, Agency Capacity, and Executive Unilateralism

“…I then use this observation, coupled with differential agency capacity, to identify implications for the relative allure of unilateral action with varying expectations of durability. Substantively, captures challenges to executive order durability such as limited presidential discretion or differential partisan influence (Chiou and Rothenberg ; Howell ), constraints introduced through public opinion (Judd ; Reeves and Rogowski ) or interest groups (Foster ), or other political determinants of executive order tenure (Thrower ). All of these represent model extensions that could be layered onto the baseline framework developed in this article.…”

“…As before, higher capacity is good news for policy quality, but now, in contrast to agency decision making following statutory policy making, the less durable executive orders are, the less quality the agency will invest in (i.e., decreases as decreases). As discussed above, can reflect important considerations like the president’s discretion in a particular policy area or the likelihood the executive order survives judicial oversight (Howell ), or any other political determinant of executive order precariousness (Thrower ). The key insight is that when bureaucratic incentives to implement policy well are endogenous, the (lack of) durability of executive orders harms those incentives relative to statutory routes to policy change, and overall quality investments are lower.…”

“…Previous research recognizes both of the factors that drive these insights. Exploring the determinants of executive order revocation, Thrower (, 643) argues that “future regimes can easily change policies, particularly presidents who can act independently from other political actors through unilateral action." Even though executive orders carry the force of law, they are structurally easier to revoke by future presidential administrations.…”

Constrained Presidential Power in Africa? Legislative Independence and Executive Rule Making in Kenya, 1963–2013

“…As a general matter, the institutional environment informs the strategic considerations of presidents and individual legislators interested in regulating executive rule making. Assuming that presidents prefer stable policy environments, they have strong incentives to seek policy stability through primary legislation rather than easily reversible subsidiary legislation (Saiegh 2011; Thrower 2017). However, the opportunity to engage in subsidiary legislation offers presidents policy flexibility and a chance to tweak the implementation of legislative statutes for their own political benefit – for example, by targeting specific interest groups, or buying electoral support from important constituencies.…”