Toward Pragmatist Methodological Relationalism

Abstract

In this article, relationalist approaches to social sciences are analyzed in terms of a conceptual distinction between “philosophizing sociology” and “sociologizing philosophy.” These mark two different attitudes toward philosophical metaphysics and ontological commitments. The authors’ own pragmatist methodological relationalism of Deweyan origin is compared with ontologically committed realist approaches, as well as with Bourdieuan methodological relationalism. It is argued that pragmatist philosophy of social sciences is an appropriate tool for assisting social scientists in their methodological work, especially as regards problem-driven case studies.

Ontological Investigations of a Pragmatic Kind? A Reply to Lauer

“…There is just no discussion of ontological matters of any kind. If this is Lauer's position, it collapses with radically anti-ontological pragmatist positions that attempt to de-ontologize the entire debate and solely focus on operationalizable research questions and methodology (Kivinen & Piiroinen, 2006;Tsilipakos, 2012;van Bouwel, 2004;van Bouwel & Weber, 2008).…”

“…1 Lauer's paper is a contribution to what can be called "meta-social ontology". Meta-social ontology is an emerging field that -in line with its big sister meta-ontology (or "meta-metaphysics", see the essays in Chalmers, Manley, & Wasserman, 2009) -examines the purpose, the methods and the viability of different approaches to social ontology (see Kivinen & Piiroinen, 2006;Lohse, 2017;van Bouwel & Weber, 2008). Lauer's metaontological contribution (a) critically assesses mainstream realist approaches to social ontology that are science-directed in that they aim at improving research in the social sciences, and (b) presents a (possibly superior) alternative pragmatist approach to social ontology.…”

Political affects in public space: normative blind‐spots in non‐representational ontologies

“…Getting your ontology right, which usually means avowing that one holds to a ‘relational ontology’, has become the benchmark of theoretical probity. The ascendancy of this sort of ontological register reflects a move to philosophise social science (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006). It is supposed that inquiry can and must be preceded by clearly delimiting the general metaphysical properties possessed by objects of analysis.…”

Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice

“…This article aims to contribute to the debate revolving around the relevance of ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences (POSS). More precisely, the article is an attempt to respond to those neopragmatist philosophers who contest the usefulness of ontological investigations for the social sciences tout court and, hence, propose that we should stop pursuing ontological projects in POSS in favor of epistemological and methodological investigations (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2006, 2007; Tsilipakos 2012; Van Bouwel and Weber 2008). 1 My goal here is to defend the view that ontological investigations of a certain kind can indeed be relevant for the social sciences.…”