Towards a more explicit taxonomy of root possibility

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to improve the description of root (or non-epistemic) possibility meanings. In previous accounts, the defining criteria are not applied systematically; there is a tendency towards definition by exemplification (especially when it comes to meanings that are 'not permission' and 'not ability') and certain categories (permission, for instance) tend to be defined in a circular way. We will argue that there are three criteria which are necessary and sufficient to distinguish five subclasses of root possibility meaning. The three criteria are: (a) the scope of the modal meaning, (b) the source of the modality and (c) the notion of potential barrier; the five meanings are: (a) ability, (b) opportunity, (c) permission, (d) general situation possibility (GSP) and (e) situation permissibility. The paper offers an in-depth analysis of the three defining criteria and the root possibility meanings that their systematic application gives rise to. This approach clearly brings out the similarities and the dissimilarities between the different subcategories of root possibility meaning in English and in this way it results in a more explicit taxonomy

Modals and lexically-regulated saturation

“…In section 4, I will illustrate my framework. First, starting from Depraetere and Reed (2011), I will present the defining criteria which I consider to be essential to define modal meanings, both in the realm of modal possibility and in the realm of modal necessity. 2 A set of examples will be given to illustrate the model, which encompasses a context-independent semantic layer, a context-dependent semantic layer (lexically-regulated saturation) and a context-dependent, pragmatic layer.…”

“…The identification and definition of epistemic possibility is relatively unproblematic. In Depraetere and Reed (2011), which is focussed on non-epistemic possibility, the authors argue for a taxonomy which pins down, in a more explicit way, categories of meaning that are not ability and not permission. The taxonomy distinguishes between general situation possibility (GSP), permissibility, permission, opportunity and ability and it is based on a clear set of defining parameters, which are systematically used to define the different categories of meaning: (a) scope of the modality (wide scope or narrow scope), (b) source of the modality (subject-internal or subject-external) and (c) potential barrier.…”

“…Must is a modal auxiliary that can express epistemic necessity (as in (26)), narrow scope internal necessity (as in (27)) narrow scope external necessity (as in (28) and (29)), and GSN (as in (30) and (31)). May can communicate epistemic possibility (as in (32)), situation permissibility (as in (33)), GSP (as in (34)) and permission (as in (35)) (Examples (33)--(35) are taken from the appendix in Depraetere and Reed (2011)). Alpine species may only be grown in temperate zones where cold winters, plentiful rainfall, and long summer days are assured.…”

“…The discussion of modal taxonomy has to be relatively short in the context of this paper, whose main focus is the nature of contextual meaning and the facets involved in modal meaning distinctions. In footnote 2, some examples of taxonomic indeterminacy are given.Depraetere and Reed (2006:281--282) andDepraetere and Reed (2011) deal with some of the issues that need to be addressed when categorizing modal meanings.…”

“…(because of his character) (1991:386).23 A similar observation applies to the distribution of possibility modals (can, could, may, might) across the different subcategories of modal necessity meanings. Questions of distribution are not addressed in any quantitative detail inDepraetere and Reed (2011) Leech and Mair (2006). andLeech et al (2009:71--90) offer a survey of recent changes in the frequency of modal verbs and their distribution.…”