No abstract

No abstract

The aim of this paper is to improve the description of root (or non-epistemic) possibility meanings. In previous accounts, the defining criteria are not applied systematically; there is a tendency towards definition by exemplification (especially when it comes to meanings that are 'not permission' and 'not ability') and certain categories (permission, for instance) tend to be defined in a circular way. We will argue that there are three criteria which are necessary and sufficient to distinguish five subclasses of root possibility meaning. The three criteria are: (a) the scope of the modal meaning, (b) the source of the modality and (c) the notion of potential barrier; the five meanings are: (a) ability, (b) opportunity, (c) permission, (d) general situation possibility (GSP) and (e) situation permissibility. The paper offers an in-depth analysis of the three defining criteria and the root possibility meanings that their systematic application gives rise to. This approach clearly brings out the similarities and the dissimilarities between the different subcategories of root possibility meaning in English and in this way it results in a more explicit taxonomy

In this article the authors examine six different analyses of the meaning of unless that have been argued in the literature, and present a new analysis in which a careful distinction is made between the semantic meaning and the pragmatic interpretations of unless. Contrary to the common belief that unless cannot be used in irrealis conditionals, it is shown that unless can actually be used in two different senses there, one in which it alternates with except if, but not if . . . not (e.g. He wouldn't have done it {unless I had / except if I had / *if I hadn't} asked him to, and I didn't) and one in which it alternates with if . . . not but not with except if (e.g. You did do well, but you wouldn't have succeeded {unless I had / if I hadn't / *except if I had} helped you). It is shown, ®nally, how the various interpretations of unless can be reconciled with a common semantic meaning and how the different constraints on the use of unless, except if and if . . . not can be accounted for. 1 This article was written within a project sponsored both by the Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek ± Vlaanderen and by the Onderzoeksfonds of the University of Leuven (KUL). We wish to thank the two anonymous referees for the useful comments they have made on the ®rst draft of this article. Of course they are in no way responsible for any erroneous claims. 2 Note that (1c) is not equivalent to (1b). I have a walk after supper if and only if the weather is ®ne implicates that I always have a walk after supper if the weather is ®ne, i.e. that ®ne weather is a suf®cient condition for my having a walk after supper. The sentence I have a walk after supper only if the weather is ®ne does not implicate this. Formulation (1b) is therefore weaker than formulation (1c). 3 Further on in his article Geis (1973: 246) says that`unless, except in the event that, and, for those who can say it, except if are alternative lexical realizations of the same underlying structure'. However, we will argue below that these phrases are not semantically equivalent to under all circumstances except or in any event other than. (The problem is the presence of all/any in the latter paraphrases.)English Language and Linguistics 4.2: 205±241. # Cambridge University Press 2000. Some preliminariesWhen talking about conditionals we will be using some terms and notational conventions that need introducing. To begin with, we will use`situation' as a cover term for anything that can be expressed in a sentence (i.e. actions, events, processes, states ± cf. Lyons, 1977). The verb`actualize' will be used as a cover term for the predicates that are typically associated with one of these categories. Thus, rather than saying that an activity is performed, an event happens, a process develops or a state holds, we will simply say that the situation in question actualizes. Second, thinking of the logical representation`If P, (then) Q', we will refer to the head clause of the conditional (whether it is itself subordinate or not) as thè Q-clause' and to the conditional clause...

This chapter is focussed on the main markers of modality in English, that is, modal verbs. We first give a definition of modality and mood and briefly discuss the different forms used to express modality. We then outline the formal properties of modal auxiliaries and the way in which these properties may lead to a classification of some verbs as more central to the category of modal auxiliary than others. The main part of the chapter is focussed on the meanings of modal verbs, and the different taxonomies that have been proposed in the empirical literature of ways to categorize modal meanings of possibility and necessity. In the course of the discussion, we pinpoint some key questions that have been and still are sources of debate in the field.