Towards a New Reward and Punishment Approach for Blockchain-based System

Ouaguid, Abdellah; Abghour, Noreddine; Ouzzif, Mohamed

doi:10.1109/syscobiots48768.2019.9028039

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The authors of [29], [30] considered a reward-penalty based mechanisms for PoS-based blockchains. In those studies, the reward/penalty is considered for the voting result of a newly generated block, whereas the voting profile of a validator is not taken into consideration.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentivization Mechanism with Validator Voting Profile in Proof-of-Stake-Based Blockchain

MATSUNAGA

ZHANG

Sasabe

et al. 2022

IEICE Trans. Commun.

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The Proof of Stake (PoS) protocol is one of the consensus algorithms for blockchain, in which the integrity of a new block is validated according to voting by nodes called validators. However, due to validatororiented voting, voting results are likely to be false when the number of validators with wrong votes increases. In the PoS protocol, validators are motivated to vote correctly by reward and penalty mechanisms. With such mechanisms, validators who contribute to correct consensuses are rewarded, while those who vote incorrectly are penalized. In this paper, we consider an incentivization mechanism based on the voting profile of a validator, which is estimated from the voting history of the validator. In this mechanism, the stake collected due to the penalties are redistributed to validators who vote correctly, improving the incentive of validators to contribute to the system. We evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism by computer simulations, investigating the impacts of system parameters on the estimation accuracy of the validator profile and the amount of validator's stake. Numerical results show that the proposed mechanism can estimate the voting profile of a validator accurately even when the voting profile dynamically changes. It is also shown that the proposed mechanism gives more reward to validators who vote correctly with high voting profile.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Incentivization Mechanism with Validator Voting Profile in Proof-of-Stake-Based Blockchain

MATSUNAGA

ZHANG

Sasabe

et al. 2022

IEICE Trans. Commun.

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“…It also contains a slashing calculation mechanism. Ouaguid et al 68 proposed a reward and punishment for leader‐based consensus algorithms, while Wang et al 69 proposed credit‐delegated Byzantine fault tolerance with a credit punishment mechanism. Baudet et al 70 proposed a punishment mechanism for LibraBFT, a BFT blockchain.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissionless proof‐of‐reputation‐X: A hybrid reputation‐based consensus algorithm for permissionless blockchains

Abdo

Sibai

Demerjian

2020

Trans Emerging Tel Tech

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Over the past years, blockchain technology has become more and more interesting since its ability to carry out transactions without any mediator. To ensure the transactions' reliability, consensus algorithms are adopted by blockchain technology. However, due to the failure of consensus algorithms in managing nodes' identities, blockchain technology is considered inappropriate for many applications. In this article, we propose the permissionless proof‐of‐reputation‐X (PL‐PoRX) that upgrades an existing consensus algorithm, the proof‐of‐reputation‐X (PoRX). PL‐PoRX replaces the trusted identity database in PoRX with a new admission process to make the algorithm suitable for permissionless blockchains, while maintaining PoRX's reputation mechanism. Several experiments are conducted to show the efficiency of our approach under different scenarios. We also debate the security model of the new protocol and study its time complexity. The results show that PL‐PoRX decreases the number of blocks issued by malicious miners, and help benign miners build reputation faster.

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