Towards a theory of action in Sartre’s philosophy. From action to ethics

Abstract

In this reading, I will approach what could be argued as the core of a theory of action in Jean-Paul Sartre's thought, tackling its ethical implications. Throughout the analysis, I will outline elements that allow for an integrated perspective of Sartre's ethical thought. I will explore a few significant passages, mainly from Sartre's masterpiece-L'Être et le Néant, his phenomenological ontology of 1943-and occasionally from other works, both earlier and later. My examination stems from two ontological considerations and develops along a set of points primarily delineating a Sartrean theory of action and ultimately a Sartrean ethics. These two underlying premises pertain to Sartre's thought on freedom and will, both quite originally defined from his phenomenological point of view. Both also frame the ensuing critical thoughts on Sartre's theory of action and Sartre's ethics. I. Freedom, not free will It is perhaps wisest to begin by precluding a misinterpretation of Sartre's understanding of freedom. For Sartre, freedom is ontological, which means that it is the very being of consciousness, of the for-itself (pour-soi). Conscious grasping of this free condition comes about through the experience of angst (angoisse). This suggests at least two things: first, that Sartre's concept of freedom does not fit any of the usual options in the philosophical debate on free will. Sartre is admittedly not a determinist who proposes that present mental states

A consciência intencional no jovem Sartre: bases fenomenológicas e perspectivas éticas

“…Uma vez que o filósofo não via como o ser humano poderia ser inteiramente determinado pelas condições materiais e econômicas, muitos marxistas consideraram sua filosofia incompatível com o 23 materialismo dialético, acusando-a de ser um subjetivismo burguês. Por essa razão, Sartre dedicará vários trabalhos para mostrar como o existencialismo vai de encontro aos ideais revolucionários, pois, segundo ele, um verdadeiro realismo não necessita de uma teoria quase que metafísica 5 como o materialismo e, considerar a ação da subjetividade no processo histórico em nada prejudicaria a compreensão de uma verdadeira dialética entre as necessidades materiais e a atuação humana no mundo natural e social.…”