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Social democracy based on welfare and the redistribution of social contributions is failing. The accumulation of wealth and the increase in inequalities are the two faces of Janus that social democracy has not been able to contain over the recent decades. In this context, it matters to discuss John Rawls's influential difference principle. According to the maximin criterion put forth by Rawls, it does not suffice that no one becomes worse off; those who are worse off must also become better off than they are. Here, we note that the existence and growth of inequality find no opposition in the maximin rule. Despite appearances, strictly speaking it merely introduces a factor of social compensation, a sort of "assistencialism" to the victims of the greatest inequality. Even the most robust formulation of the principle of difference, according to which the greatest advantage to the less advantaged is indispensable, does not per se preclude an aggregate growth of inequalities. It seems clear that it was an egalitarian goal what Rawls had in mind in A Theory of Justice. Rawls's critical comments on welfare capitalism must indeed not be forgotten-especially in his further explanations about the application of the principles of justice in a property-owning democracy. Here, as in liberal socialism, the dispersion of property, capital and resources prevents economic and political powers from being concentrated into the hands of a minority. However, the egalitarian aim does not strictly follow from the difference principle as stated, whether taken literally as an application of the maximin rule or inferring from its strongest formulation. A reformulation that does justice to the egalitarian aim of the principle of difference is, however, possible: namely, a degrowthist reformulation, truly requiring a degrowth in accumulation and inequalities, making explicit a brake clause that hinders the aggregate growth of inequalities. Such a degrowthist conception of the difference principle may justify some concrete rules that are able to enforce the egalitarian commitments of social democracy.

O objetivo central deste artigo é desenvolver uma interpretação e uma compreensão do fenómeno político-social da austeridade nas suas relações com a instauração de um regime social de existência precária que se abateu, a partir de 2008, sobre Portugal e alguns países da Europa. Deste propósito resultam outros dois objetivos parcelares: por um lado, pretendese caracterizar este processo como um regime social da precariedade nas suas condições existenciais mais estruturais, designadamente nas suas estruturas espaciotemporais; por outro, identificar os meios político-económicos pelos quais essas condições foram sendo instauradas, a partir de uma modificação profunda da vida social das populações. Analisar-se-ão as formas de desinstitucionalização decorrentes da implementação dos programas de austeridade e o seu impacto num conjunto de esferas sociais: na depreciação e desvalorização da atividade do trabalho, na incerteza da vivência espaciotemporal, no exercício da racionalidade no contexto da ação humana. Por fim, mostra-se como posicionamentos políticos de oposição à austeridade tendem a fundar a sua ação política subvertendo as condições espaciotemporais que a austeridade procura impor.Palavras-chave: austeridade, ideologia política, teoria social, trabalho Teoría social de la austeridad: para una crítica del proceso de precarización El objetivo central de este artículo es desarrollar una interpretación y una comprensión del fenómeno político-social de la austeridad en sus relaciones con la instauración de un régimen social de existencia precaria, que se cernió a partir de 2008 sobre Portugal y algunos países de Europa. De este propósito resultan otros dos objetivos partícipes: por un lado, se pretende caracterizar este proceso como un régimen social de la precariedad en sus condiciones existenciales más estructurales, principalmente en sus estructuras espaciotemporales; por otro, identificar los medios político-económicos por los que esas condiciones

segundo semestre de 2015. A principal contribuição da pesquisa é ter identificado que os frameworks de GTI estão ficando cada vez mais complexos e de difícil implantação, e as organizações podem obter excelentes resultados sem necessariamente implantar todos os processos previstos no framework, mas focando nos processos críticos. Isso abre uma oportunidade para rever os processos de implantação deste framework, adequando-os às necessidades específicas de cada organização.

In this reading, I will approach what could be argued as the core of a theory of action in Jean-Paul Sartre's thought, tackling its ethical implications. Throughout the analysis, I will outline elements that allow for an integrated perspective of Sartre's ethical thought. I will explore a few significant passages, mainly from Sartre's masterpiece-L'Être et le Néant, his phenomenological ontology of 1943-and occasionally from other works, both earlier and later. My examination stems from two ontological considerations and develops along a set of points primarily delineating a Sartrean theory of action and ultimately a Sartrean ethics. These two underlying premises pertain to Sartre's thought on freedom and will, both quite originally defined from his phenomenological point of view. Both also frame the ensuing critical thoughts on Sartre's theory of action and Sartre's ethics. I. Freedom, not free will It is perhaps wisest to begin by precluding a misinterpretation of Sartre's understanding of freedom. For Sartre, freedom is ontological, which means that it is the very being of consciousness, of the for-itself (pour-soi). Conscious grasping of this free condition comes about through the experience of angst (angoisse). This suggests at least two things: first, that Sartre's concept of freedom does not fit any of the usual options in the philosophical debate on free will. Sartre is admittedly not a determinist who proposes that present mental states