Towards an Internally Consistent Doctrine on Invoking Norms of EU Law

Abstract

This chapter discusses the way in which EU norms can be invoked. It determines how, in dialogue with national courts, the ECJ has sent out diverging signals as to when norms of EU law can be invoked. On the one hand, divergence flows from conflicting conceptual approaches to invocability; on the other hand, it can be linked to the piecemeal construction of case law. Moreover, the introduction of the Third Pillar instruments has created further uncertainty. It is argued that divergence can be overcome. The chapter then restates an alternative reading of case law which recalls the role played by primacy in invoking norms of EU law.

The European Court of Justice and the Policy Process

“…If several basic freedoms are relevant to a case and they are interpreted analogously, this strengthens the coherence of case law (Lenaerts and Corthaut 2008). Figure 3.5 shows how common it is for the different freedoms to be simultaneously relevant in a single ruling.…”

Bezpośredni skutek „dyrektywy obrończej” w polskim procesie karnym

“…Zauważono zarazem (sprawa van Duyn 42 ), że nawet jeśli istnieją wątpliwości co do właściwej i jednoznacznej wykładni takiego przepisu, to sąd krajowy dysponuje prawem (a czasem wręcz obowiązkiem) zadania TSUE pytania prejudycjalnego co do interpretacji takiego przepisu, skutkiem czego może być uznanie jego bezpośredniej skuteczności w prawie krajowym 43 . Podkreśla się również w literaturze, że TSUE dość liberalnie stosuje te warunki 44 , co zresztą tworzy dość dezorientujący obraz -są znane przypadki orzeczeń, w których za wywołujące bezpośrednie skutki uznawano przepisy niemające w ogóle mocy wiążącej, nieodnoszące się do żadnych uprawnień albo niezbyt precyzyjne 45 . Można twierdzić, że w pewnych wypadkach dla TSUE istotniejsze jest osiągnięcie celu określonej regulacji unijnej niż dokładnie wypełnianie, orzeczniczo przecież ustalonych, przesłanek bezpośredniej skuteczności na poziomie językowej redakcji przepisu.…”

From Strasbourg to Luxembourg? Transposing the Margin of Appreciation Concept into EU Law

“…This is consistent with the fact that some EU secondary law measures adopted by the EU institutions have precisely the objective to ensure that the level of protection of a given right is equivalent in all Member States, in order to avoid the divergences which may exist between the relevant laws in the Member States undermining the objectives pursued in a particular area of EU law. 130 Although the existence and degree of EU harmonisation in a given field might be criticised as being an irrelevant factor on the variation of the intensity of judicial review by the national measures within the conception of the margin of appreciation as a tool to respect pluralism (considering that this harmonisation purely corresponds to the political will of Member States and their intentions to unify their legislations in certain fields) 131 , it is submitted that the level of harmonisation provided by the EU legislative instrument constitutes already a reflection of the consensus among Member States 132 , and that this "legislative consensus" 133 will impact the accommodation of diversity at the EU level in a similar manner as it does in the ECHR system. As the Court observed in Melloni regarding the common definition of the right at stake and the balance with the relevant competing interests, "the Framework Decision 2009/299 […] effects a harmonisation of the conditions of execution of a European arrest warrant in the event of a conviction rendered in absentia, which reflects the consensus reached by all the Member States regarding the scope to be given under EU law to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons convicted in absentia who are the subject of a European arrest warrant".…”