Towards deploying a scalable & robust vehicular identity and credential management infrastructure

Abstract

Abstract---Several years of academic and industrial research efforts have converged to a common understanding on fundamental security building blocks for the upcoming Vehicular Communication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus towards deploying a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) enables pseudonymous authentication, with standardization efforts in that direction. However, there are still significant technical issues that remain unresolved. Existing proposals for instantiating the VPKI either need additional detailed specifications or enhanced security and privacy features. Equally important, there is limited experimental work that establishes the VPKI efficiency and scalability. In this paper, we are concerned with exactly these issues. We leverage the common VPKI approach and contribute an enhanced system with precisely defined, novel features that improve its resilience and the user privacy protection. In particular, we depart from the common assumption that the VPKI entities are fully trusted and we improve user privacy in the face of an honest-but-curious security infrastructure. Moreover, we fully implement our VPKI, in a standard-compliant manner, and we perform an extensive evaluation. Along with stronger protection and richer functionality, our system achieves very significant performance improvement over prior systems -contributing the most advanced VPKI towards deployment.

Scalable & Resilient Vehicle-Centric Certificate Revocation List Distribution in Vehicular Communication Systems

“…Moreover, we assume that there is a misbehavior detection system, e.g., [51], that triggers the revocation. The Resolution Authority (RA) can initiate a process to resolve and revoke all pseudonyms of a misbehaving vehicle: it interacts with the corresponding PCAs and LTCA (a detailed protocol description in [27], [43], [52]) to resolve and revoke all credentials issued for a misbehaving vehicle. Consequently, the misbehaving vehicle can no longer obtain credentials from the VPKI.…”

Security and Privacy in Vehicular Social Networks

“…However, this would not work if there exist multiple pseudonym providers (so that a vehicle can request pseudonyms from the closest one) and a vehicle can request pseudonyms from different pseudonym providers. This is due to the separation of duties among authorities is enforced in VC domain so that the pseudonym providers are not allowed to share their records (otherwise the authorities could collude and infer extra information) [33], [24]. [33] proposes a ticket-based scheme: an anonymized ticket is obtained from identity provider, then the ticket is used to obtain pseudonyms from a pseudonym provider.…”

“…This is due to the separation of duties among authorities is enforced in VC domain so that the pseudonym providers are not allowed to share their records (otherwise the authorities could collude and infer extra information) [33], [24]. [33] proposes a ticket-based scheme: an anonymized ticket is obtained from identity provider, then the ticket is used to obtain pseudonyms from a pseudonym provider. Each ticket is bound to a specific pseudonym provider without disclosing the targeted pseudonym provider to the identity provider, so that each ticket can be used only once while not revealing location of the vehicle to the identity provider.…”

“…While privacy is important in VC systems, strong identification of drivers and vehicles is needed considering the high stakes in traffic systems (notably, driver and passenger safety): the messages in VC systems need to be properly protected by proving that the messages are originated from legitimate users in the system, in order to guarantee the secure and privacy preserving operations in the system. Both of the requirements can be achieved leveraging pseudonymous authentication [45], [35], [10], [30], [44], [26], [33]. In fact, security and privacy in VC systems have been extensively studied and significant effort has already been made towards the deployment of secure VC systems, which are the basis for secure ITSs.…”

SePCAR: A Secure and Privacy-Enhancing Protocol for Car Access Provision

“…EVITA [22] and PRESERVE [40] are designated projects on the design and specification of the secure architecture of on-board units. Driven by the PRESERVE instantiation, Raya et al [42] described the need for a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), and Khodaei et al [34] proposed a generic pseudonymization approach to preserve the unlinkability of messages exchanged between vehicles and VPKI servers. None of these solutions provides a full-fledged keyless car sharing system.…”