Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety

Starbird, S. Andrew; Amanor‐Boadu, Vincent; Roberts, Tanya

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1328101

Cited by 7 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…To avoid ambiguity in this paper we use the terms textile manufacturer and retailer. The model assumes three components of the supply chain, namely textile manufacturer, retailer, and customer, which is similar to that of used in the literature (e.g., [3,16,17,28]). The textile manufacturer serves the retailer and the retailer serves the end-use customer.…”

Section: Model Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More recently, increasing attention has been paid to traceability-based ex-post quality inspection techniques [3,16,17]. Traceability-based ex-post inspection extends the quality inspection perspective beyond the point of supply transaction and any quality-related issue can be traced back at any stage of the product lifecycle using the traceability information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies to approach different business objectives using traceability have been discussed in the past. For the food and agribusiness, traceability has been discussed in relation with safety, recalls, inventory management and other related aspects including quality management system, product and process history [10,16,17,20,21]. Cheng et al [3] explored traceability for optimizing supply chain quality from a textile supply chain perspective.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Strategies for Quality Inspection under a Customer Return Policy: A Game Theoretical Approach

Kumar

Ekwall

Wang

2016

Entropy

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This paper outlines the quality inspection strategies in a supplier-buyer supply chain under a customer return policy. This paper primarily focuses on product quality and quality inspection techniques to maximize the actors' and supply chain's profits using game theory approach. The supplier-buyer setup is described in terms of textile manufacturer-retailer supply chain where quality inspection is an important aspect and the product return from the customer is generally accepted. Textile manufacturer produces the product, whereas, retailer acts as a reseller who buys the products from the textile manufacturer and sells them to the customers. In this context, the former invests in the product quality whereas the latter invests in the random quality inspection and traceability. The relationships between the textile manufacturer and the retailer are recognized as horizontal and vertical alliances and modeled using non-cooperative and cooperative games. The non-cooperative games are based on the Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium models. Further, bargaining and game change scenarios have been discussed to maximize the profit under different games. To understand the appropriateness of a strategic alliance, a computational study demonstrates textile manufacturer-retailer relation under different game scenarios.

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Section: Model Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Supply Chain Strategies for Quality Inspection under a Customer Return Policy: A Game Theoretical Approach

Kumar

Ekwall

Wang

2016

Entropy

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“…They also suggest that it is impossible to have full traceability in food, regardless of mandatory or voluntary systems, and that choices have to be made on which attributes will be traceable. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004) use a principal-agent model approach to analyze the implications of introducing traceability in a food supply chain where there is an inspection protocol. The producer is the agent and knows how safe the product is; the processor (the principal) does not know the quality and safety of the product.…”

Section: Operations Research and Economic Approaches To Traceability mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Traceability is an information management tool and its effectiveness and efficiency may be affected by information asymmetries and imperfections. As in Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004), we use a principal-agent model, but in our case we analyze traceability as an endogenous variable.…”

Section: Operations Research and Economic Approaches To Traceability mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Economics of Voluntary Traceability in Multi‐Ingredient Food Chains

Souza-Monteiro

Caswell

2010

Agribusiness

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The consumption of multi-ingredient foods is increasing across the globe. Traceability can be used as a tool to gather information about and manage food safety risks associated with these types of products. The authors investigate the choice of voluntary traceability in three-tiered multi-ingredient food supply chains. They propose a framework based on vertical control and agency theory to model three dimensions of traceability systems: depth, breadth, and precision. Their analysis has three main results. First, full traceability is feasible as long as there are net benefits to a downstream firm that demands traceability across all ingredients. Second, horizontal network externalities are positive because an increase in the level of traceability in one ingredient requires a similar increase in others. Finally, vertical network effects will be positive insofar as willingness to pay and probabilities of food safety hazards increase. [EconLit Classification: Q130, L140]. r

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Food for thought: “four Ss with one F”

Rehber

2012

British Food Journal

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PurposeThis review aims to reexamine the main issues of the food problem under a new concept coined as “Four Ss with one F”. It aims to provide a stimulus for thinking food problems through a simple formula “Four Ss with one F” for getting the “full” story at a glance.Design/methodology/approachThis descriptive paper is based on an extensive literature review as well as personal observations gained from previous studies.FindingsThe three Ss, security or insecurity, safety, and sovereignty have been major topics in the public agenda for a long time as food‐related problems. When the basic idea “food for all” is considered, these are not inclusive enough. The fourth concept can be described as shareability. These concepts are not competitive but complementary, even overlapping to some extent. Food sovereignty and shareability can be considered opposing concepts to the available free‐market based approaches in the efforts to bring all people food security and food safety. This revision evidenced that despite the many efforts in this field for several decades, present free market oriented approaches have not led to solutions to the problem of food security and providing safe food to all people, i.e. “food for all”. Hunger does not result from a shortage in the food supply as generally argued. The food problem is related to poverty and the inability to purchase food. It is not possible to solve hunger and nutrition problems and maintain a permanent social peace without equality and justice in income distribution throughout the world in such a way that poor people have enough income to access vital basic food needs.Originality/valueThis paper introduces a new concept in food science as shareability along with considering previous concepts of food, security, safety and sovereignty, all together.

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Traceability, Moral Hazard, and Food Safety

Cited by 7 publications

References 4 publications

Supply Chain Strategies for Quality Inspection under a Customer Return Policy: A Game Theoretical Approach

Supply Chain Strategies for Quality Inspection under a Customer Return Policy: A Game Theoretical Approach

The Economics of Voluntary Traceability in Multi‐Ingredient Food Chains

Food for thought: “four Ss with one F”

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