Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences

Moue, Aspasia; Masavetas, K.; Karayianni, Haido S.

doi:10.1007/s10838-006-8906-8

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Yakın tarihe gelindiğinde kuramcıları tarafından düşünce deneylerine sıklıkla başvurulan iki büyük alan görelilik kuramı (Brown 1991;Norton 1991Norton , ayrıca 1993 ve kuantum mekaniğidir (Popper 1998;Bishop 1999). Einstein, Schrödinger ve Heisenberg gibi isimler bilim tarihinin en seçkin düşünce deneylerini ortaya koymuşlardır (Moue et al 2006).…”

Section: Bilim Ve Felsefe Tarihinde Düşünce Deneylerinin Kullanımıunclassified

Bilimlerde Düşünce Deneyleri

Ates¹

2015

MJH

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Düşünce deneylerine bilimlerde sıkça rastlanmaktadır. Bu deneylerin kullanımı her ne kadar Sokrates öncesi döneme kadar götürülebilse de, on yedinci yüzyılın başından itibaren Galileo, Newton ve Leibniz gibi bilim adamları bu zihinsel araçların önemini kavramıştır. Günümüzde ise, şüphesiz görelilik fiziği ve kuantum mekaniğinde düşünce deneyleri merkezi bir role sahiptir. Bu makalenin amacı bilimsel akılyürütmenin bu önemli aracını felsefi bir noktadan hareketle incelemektir. İlk olarak düşünce deneylerine ilişkin kısa bir tarihsel arka plan sağlayarak, bilimlerde kullanımı ele alacağım. Daha sonra iyi bilinen bir düşünce deneyi örneği üzerinden bu deneylerin sergilediği temel özellikleri göstereceğim. Son olarak, düşünce deneylerinin sahip olduğu birçok temel işlevi bazı örnekler üzerinden inceleyeceğim.

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Section: Bilim Ve Felsefe Tarihinde Düşünce Deneylerinin Kullanımıunclassified

Bilimlerde Düşünce Deneyleri

Ates¹

2015

MJH

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“…These are all different answers to the same question: 'What is the nature of the cognitive process involved in arriving at a conclusion based on an imaginary scenario?' (see Moue, Masavetas & Karayianni, 2006).…”

Section: Introduction 11 Thought Experiments As Academic Disputesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stock issues and the structure of argumentative discussions: An integrative analysis

Popa

Wagemans

2021

Journal of Pragmatics

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I would like to thank my promotor, prof. Frans van Eemeren, and my co-promotor, dr. Jean Wagemans for their invaluable guidance. I cannot imagine a scenario in which this dissertation would have seen print without their support and ever-sharp critique. This critique might have ruffled my spirits at times, prone as I am to think my ideas are just terrific, but Frans and Jean were always right. Their tact and patience during these four years have left a lasting impression on me. I shall aim to follow suit as much as possible in my own academic life. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the University of Amsterdam. The Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric has been a place of fertile academic discussions and even more fertile non-academic ones. I am especially grateful to dr. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans for encouraging me to apply for the PhD position that resulted in this dissertation and to my officemates, dr. Roosmaryn Pilgram, drs. Jacky Visser, and dr. Bert Meuffels, for tolerating me and my ways in room 5.09.For their unconditional encouragement, meaning that they encouraged me without really knowing what exactly I was doing, I thank my family and friends. They helped me keep my feet on the ground and put things in perspective even when the big, scary deadlines were hanging over me. I hope they realize how important they were and still are.Finally, I would like to thank Carmen, the girl I am trying to impress with all this, for being funny and sweet all these years.

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“…Mélanie Frappier et al puts the things this way " […] there is no consensus on the cognitive power of thought experiments, their logical character, the nature of their content, or the proper domains of their application" (Frappier 2013, 1). On the contrary, some authors, leaving aside this problem, think that we do not need a definition of what thought experiments are to assess their cognitive significance for scientific development (see Bunzl 1996;Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2003;Moue et al 2006 andUrbaniak 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments

Mondragón¹

2017

Transversal

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Abstract:Thought experiments are widely used in natural science research. Nonetheless, their reliability to produce cognitive results has been a disputable matter. This study is conducted to present some rules of confirmation for evaluating the cognitive outcome of thought experiments. I begin given an example of a "paradigmatic" thought experiment from Galileo Galilei: the falling bodies. Afterwards, I briefly surveying two different accounts of thought experiments: James R. Brown's rationalism and John D. Norton's empiricism. Then, I discuss their positions and I show that none of them may tip the balance towards the rationalism or empiricism they try to defend. Finally, I put forward that the notion of confirmation, connected to the notion of increasing plausibility, can be used to develop some confirmation rules to compare the explanatory power of thought experiments in competition, regardless of their rational or empirical nature in which the discussion of this type of experiment has been engaged in recent years.

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Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences

Cited by 22 publications

References 14 publications

Bilimlerde Düşünce Deneyleri

Bilimlerde Düşünce Deneyleri

Stock issues and the structure of argumentative discussions: An integrative analysis

Evaluating the Cognitive Success of Thought Experiments

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