Trade Gains from Legal Rulings in the WTO Dispute Settlement System

Abstract

Using bilateral trade data on WTO disputes from 1995 to 2010 within the framework of multilateral trade, this paper empirically investigates whether legally winning a WTO dispute leads to actual trade gains. This study helps to illuminate the efficacy of the WTO dispute settlement system and to understand the role of the system as an institutional device for promoting multilateral trade liberalization. Assessing differential effects of the WTO dispute settlement rulings and the legal status of participants, this paper examines how trade gains are created and distributed among WTO members. Our empirical findings suggest that winning a legal dispute contributes to multilateral trade liberalization, not merely by rectifying trade problems for prevailing complainants but more so by providing better market access for all WTO members. This result reaffirms that the WTO dispute settlement system fulfills its purpose as a regulatory instrument for promoting multilateralism and market competition.

Effect of the Duration of Membership in the GATT/WTO on Economic Growth Volatility

“…The dispute settlement mechanism under the GATT and the WTO also contributes to the effective enforcement of multilateral trade rules through ensuring a fair competition in the market, including the protection of members' rights to foreign markets access, and securing negotiated gains from trade liberalization. In this regard, it contributes to enhancing the predictability and stability of trading conditions (e.g., Balding, 2010;Davey, 2009;Hudec, 1993;Jones, 2009;Shin and Ahn, 2019). In this way, the membership in the GATT/WTO can help improve member states' credibility (e.g., Dreher and Voigt, 2011), as well as their domestic policies, governance and trade-related institutions (e.g., Aaronson and Abouharb, 2014;Basu, 2008;Basu et al, 2008;Drabek and Bacchetta, 2004).…”

The effects of China’s cross-border e-commerce on its exports: a comparative analysis of goods and services trade

“…The general FE model is defined as follows [68]: lnEX i,j,t = 0 + 1 lnCBEC i,t * BR i,t + 2 lnGDP i,t + 3 lnGDP j,t + 4 lnDIST i,j + 5 COMLANG i,j + 6 CONTI i,j + 7 FTA i,j,t + i,j,t lnEX i,j,t = 0 + 1 lnCBEC i,t * lnDIST i,j + 2 lnGDP i,t + 3 lnGDP j,t + 4 lnDIST i,j + 5 COMLANG i,j + 6 CONTI i,j + 7 FTA i,j,t + i,j,t lnEX i,j,t = 0 + 1 lnCBEC i,t * t + 2 lnGDP i,t + 3 lnGDP j,t + 4 lnDIST i,j + 5 COMLANG i,j + 6 CONTI i,j + 7 FTA i,j,t + i,j,t Some studies use FE estimation to deal with the possible heterogeneity and endogeneity issues in a gravity model [69,70]. In this way, all time-invariant factors that are specific to a country pair as well as other unobservable characteristics (such as political, or economic characteristics) of the country pairs can be captured by the country-pair dummies [71][72][73]. However, a major shortcoming of the FE estimation is that any time-invariant variables in a gravity model, such as distance, will be absorbed into country pair FE, not allowing the estimation of coefficients on these variables.…”

Legitymizacja działań Światowej Organizacji Handlu a kryzys Organu Apelacyjnego systemu rozstrzygania sporów

“…W przypadku działalności WTO protest społeczny nie przybrał jeszcze nasilonej formy w zakresie respektowania norm i orzeczeń systemu rozstrzygania sporów w WTO, przy pojawiających się w Stanach Zjednoczonych i w Wielkiej Brytanii protestach w związku z trudną sytuacją ekonomiczną (The Economist, 2016 Działanie systemu rozstrzygania sporów zapobiegło eskalacji konfliktów handlowych i zwiększania poziomu protekcjonizmu. Empiryczne badania potwierdziły zależność między rozstrzygnięciem sporu handlowego a wielostronną liberalizacją handlu (Shin, Ahn, 2019).…”