Trade Rage: Audience Costs and International Trade

Casler, Don; Clark, R. T.

doi:10.1177/0022002721994085

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In many cases, the public is willing to disregard process considerations if they share partisan identity with the president or support the underlying policy. Much research on audience costs also suggests that the public cares more about the leader’s underlying policy choice than whether or not they maintained consistency with prior commitments (Chaudoin, 2014; Casler and Clark, 2021; Kertzer and Brutger, 2016).…”

Section: Attitudes Towards Secrecy In International Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Myrick

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Many international agreements, from routine trade deals to high-stakes nuclear agreements, are negotiated in secret. However, we have a limited understanding of how secrecy in a negotiation shapes attitudes towards the agreement. Public opinion matters because it informs government decisions about when to conceal or reveal information during a negotiation. In a survey experiment of U.S. adults, I first examine overall attitudes towards secrecy in security and economic agreements. I then randomize government justifications for negotiating in secret: improved success, protection of sensitive information, and anticipation of criticism from domestic and international opponents. I find that respondents are generally averse to secrecy in international negotiations, but there are justifications for its use that they perceive as more legitimate. Secrecy is more permissible when negotiations contain sensitive information or when it improves the likelihood that agreements are reached. It is less permissible when governments negotiate in secret to avoid domestic criticism.

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Section: Attitudes Towards Secrecy In International Negotiationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Myrick

2023

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“… 48 Tomz (2007); Chaudoin (2014); Gray and Hicks (2014); Gray (2013); Schelling (1960); Crescenzi et al (2012); Liao and McDowell (2021); Casler and Clark (2021). …”

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confidence: 99%

How promise breaking in trade rhetoric shapes attitudes toward bilateral US-China trade cooperation

Schweinberger

2022

Bus. Polit.

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The ongoing trade war between the United States and China represents one of the most severe deteriorations of trade cooperation in modern times. In this context, the ferocious trade rhetoric accusing China of breaking promises in trade policy is striking. A previously unexamined question in this context arises: How does this rhetoric shape individual attitudes toward bilateral trade cooperation? My analysis of original survey experiments from the United States and China (n = 4181) suggests that this type of rhetoric has important ramifications. Experimental evidence from both countries suggests that individuals react more strongly to rhetoric emphasizing negative than positive past behaviour of the trading partner. Overall, this pattern prevails independently of the identity of the trading partner. Promise-breaking trade narratives, a key contextual dimension of the US-China trade war, diminish the perceived level of trustworthiness of the other country. A conjoint analysis suggests that individuals’ trade cooperation attitudes are also shaped by rhetoric targeting issue areas beyond trade, such as military affairs and human rights. These findings highlight the importance of contextual factors accompanying the US-China trade war context. Thereby, this article emphasizes the potential for political elites to effectively leverage fundamental individual fairness principles for invigorating opposition to open trading relations.

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“…12.In a similar line of thinking, Casler and Clark (2020) conceptualize how the public would react differently to threats leaders make in trade relations as compared to in security relations with other countries.…”

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confidence: 99%

Institutional Design, Information Transmission, and Public Opinion: Making the Case for Trade

Brutger

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Domestic debates about trade have increased the salience of international economic cooperation among the public, raising the question of whether, and how, domestic support can be rallied in support of international trade agreements. We argue that institutional features of trade agreements provide important cues to domestic audiences that shape support, particularly the membership composition and voting rules for multilateral deals. We use two survey experiments to show that the US public is more supportive of trade when it is negotiated with like-minded countries. We also find that the voting rules shape support for trade agreements, but differently across partisan audiences. Republican voters strongly favor the home country having veto power, whereas Democrats prefer agreements with equal voting rules. These differences are largely driven by perceptions of the agreement’s benefit for the nation and the public’s trust of the negotiators and perceived fairness of the rules.

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Trade Rage: Audience Costs and International Trade

Cited by 7 publications

References 53 publications

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics

How promise breaking in trade rhetoric shapes attitudes toward bilateral US-China trade cooperation

Institutional Design, Information Transmission, and Public Opinion: Making the Case for Trade

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