2003
DOI: 10.2307/3186136
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Tradition and Prudence in Locke's Exceptions to Toleration

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“…Locke's defense of toleration, for instance, is at least dithering when it comes to the Catholics, "and he is famous for denying toleration to atheists" (Wolfson 1997, 216). 29 As David J. Lorenzo has observed, this is a consequence of Locke's reliance on pragmatic justification (Lorenzo 2003). Avoiding "prudence" and "pragmatism," Rumi is tolerant of all who believe in God regardless of their religious affiliation, and does not sanction the persecution of the (peaceful) atheists either.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Locke's defense of toleration, for instance, is at least dithering when it comes to the Catholics, "and he is famous for denying toleration to atheists" (Wolfson 1997, 216). 29 As David J. Lorenzo has observed, this is a consequence of Locke's reliance on pragmatic justification (Lorenzo 2003). Avoiding "prudence" and "pragmatism," Rumi is tolerant of all who believe in God regardless of their religious affiliation, and does not sanction the persecution of the (peaceful) atheists either.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Desde la óptica lockeana, no había dudas de que hay una visión correcta (el cristianismo) y una miríada de visiones erradas. No obstante, del "error" de las segundas no se desprendía la necesidad de su prohibición; más bien al contrario, las ideas disímiles deberían ser aceptadas y, en la medida de lo posible, re-encausadas hacia la consecución del bienestar de la comunidad (CHEN, 1998;LORENZO, 2003;TUCKNESS, 2002). En principio los planteos de Locke y Nozick parecen compatibles; no obstante, esta apariencia se desvanece cuando consideramos que Nozick rechaza los conceptos de Comunidad y Bien Común que Locke precisa tomar en cuenta para darle sentido a su visión de la tolerancia.…”
Section: De Lo Justo a Lo Utópicounclassified