Transboundary water sharing problem; a theoretical analysis using evolutionary game and system dynamics

Yuan, Liang; He, Weijun; Degefu, Dagmawi Mulugeta; Liao, Zaiyi; Wu, Xin; An, Malaviya; Zhang, Zhaofang; Ramsey, Thomas Stephen

doi:10.1016/j.jhydrol.2019.124521

Cited by 52 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…System dynamics is a quantitative simulation method to analyze information feedback mechanism, which is often used to study complex systems [ 11 , 57 ]. In previous studies, given the complex nonlinear relationship among multiplayer evolutionary game players, SD has been applied to simulate the stability of the equilibrium solution of multiplayer evolutionary games, such as resource allocation [ 58 ], public-private partnership projects [ 59 ], environmental regulation [ 60 ], and safety regulation [ 11 ]. Therefore, based on the stakeholders’ feedback behaviors in the evolutionary game model analyzed above, SD was applied to simulate and validate the evolutionary game process and analyze the implementation effect and equilibrium state of different supervision strategies.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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The construction industry suffers from poor safety performance caused by the joint effect of insufficient safety investment by contractors and inefficient safety supervision by the government because of the information gap between the two sides. The present study aims to put forward a new pathway to improve safety investment supervision efficiency and analyze the decision-making interactions of stakeholders under this new pathway. For this purpose, this study establishes a safety investment information system to eliminate the information gap between the government and contractors for construction projects in China and further develops a dynamic safety investment supervision mechanism based on this. Evolutionary game theory is used to describe the decision-making interactions among stakeholders under the current static supervision mechanism and the dynamic supervision mechanism proposed in this research. Moreover, system dynamics is adopted to simulate the evolutionary game process and analyze the supervision effect and equilibrium state of different supervision mechanisms. The results reveal that the proposed safety investment information system could facilitate the transition of the supervision mode from static to dynamic; the evolutionarily stable strategy does not exist in the current static penalty scenario; and the dynamic supervision mechanism that correlates penalties with contractors’ unlawful behavior probability can restrain the fluctuation of the evolutionary game model effectively and the players’ strategy choices gradually stabilize in the equilibrium state. The results validate the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic supervision mechanism in improving supervision efficiency. This study not only contributes to the literature on safety supervision policy-making but also helps to improve supervision efficiency in practice.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Gong

Gao

Zhou

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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show abstract

“…Institutions of each country delineate the national rights and obligations regarding shared water bodies, signed agreements, or implicit cooperative arrangements, and have in place conflict resolution mechanisms [161]. Moreover, institutions may keep a chronological archive of past and current records for river basin data and issues, analyze the causes of transboundary water conflict, and manage risks from future climate shifts, growth of populations, national policies-measures, and water management [161,162].…”

Section: New Approaches Of Negotiation and Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Water Conflicts: From Ancient to Modern Times and in the Future

et al. 2021

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Since prehistoric times, water conflicts have occurred as a result of a wide range of tensions and/or violence, which have rarely taken the form of traditional warfare waged over water resources alone. Instead, water has historically been a (re)source of tension and a factor in conflicts that start for other reasons. In some cases, water was used directly as a weapon through its ability to cause damage through deprivation or erosion or water resources of enemy populations and their armies. However, water conflicts, both past and present, arise for several reasons; including territorial disputes, fight for resources, and strategic advantage. The main reasons of water conflicts are usually delimitation of boundaries, waterlogging (e.g., dams and lakes), diversion of rivers flow, running water, food, and political distresses. In recent decades, the number of human casualties caused by water conflicts is more than that of natural disasters, indicating the importance of emerging trends on water wars in the world. This paper presents arguments, fights, discourses, and conflicts around water from ancient times to the present. This diachronic survey attempts to provide water governance alternatives for the current and future.

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“…On the one hand, the causes of transboundary water conflicts are the different interests of stakeholders in flood control, water quantity, water quality or shipping, as well as economic development and protection costs (Yu et al, 2015;Yu et al, 2019b). The severity and complexity of transboundary water conflicts are determined by these interests (Yuan et al, 2020). If the interests and needs of stakeholders are not well coordinated, a water conflict will become deadlocked or grow even worse (Wei et al, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If the interests and needs of stakeholders are not well coordinated, a water conflict will become deadlocked or grow even worse (Wei et al, 2010). On the other hand, conflicts, including transboundary water conflicts, are characterized by dynamic evolution (Ali et al, 2019;Yuan et al, 2020). In a conflict, when a decision-maker (DM) changes its strategic behavior, other DMs will make corresponding strategic adjustments based on their interests (Nazari et al, 2020).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As an effective method of resolving conflicts over complicated environmental issues between multiple DMs, game theory can achieve a more realistic simulation of the interest-based decision-making behavior of stakeholders (Dowlatabadi et al, 2020;Madani, 2010;Shi et al, 2016). Although cooperative and non-cooperative game models are generally used to analyze water conflicts, many of them are qualitative analyses that do not consider the dynamic evolutionary characteristics of conflict (Yuan et al, 2020;Zomorodian et al, 2017). The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Kilgour et al, 1987), which is a conflict resolution method developed based on classical game theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), can simulate the dynamic evolution of the behavior of DMs (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Resolving Transboundary Water Conflicts: Dynamic Evolutionary Analysis Using an Improved GMCR Model

Yang

Che

et al. 2021

Water Resour Manage

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Accurately and objectively simulating the dynamic evolution of the behaviors of different decision-makers (DMs) is essential for identifying solutions to transboundary water conflicts. This research proposes an improved Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) based on the benefits of DMs' behaviors to model the dynamic evolution of transboundary water conflicts. Additionally, the influence of third-party intervention on conflicts is investigated in depth. A demonstration area in the Yangtze River Delta on ecologically friendly development (DAYRD) in China is taken as the case study area. The results indicate that the improved GMCR model based on the benefit function can not only clearly identify the dynamic evolution path of transboundary water conflicts into cooperation, but also effectively avoid the

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Transboundary water sharing problem; a theoretical analysis using evolutionary game and system dynamics

Cited by 52 publications

References 37 publications

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Developing a Dynamic Supervision Mechanism to Improve Construction Safety Investment Supervision Efficiency in China: Theoretical Simulation of Evolutionary Game Process

Water Conflicts: From Ancient to Modern Times and in the Future

Resolving Transboundary Water Conflicts: Dynamic Evolutionary Analysis Using an Improved GMCR Model

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