Transmission schedules to prevent traffic analysis

Venkatraman, B.R.; Newman-Wolfe, R.

doi:10.1109/csac.1993.315448

Cited by 16 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The idea of a fixed schedule was previously presented by Newman-Wolfe and Venkatraman [7], [8] and by Radosavljevic and Hajek [9]. However, references [7] and [8] focus on the case of a fully connected network and do not exploit the wireless network topology to schedule simultaneous, noninterfering transmissions across the network to increase the throughput.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, references [7] and [8] focus on the case of a fully connected network and do not exploit the wireless network topology to schedule simultaneous, noninterfering transmissions across the network to increase the throughput. A different approach to anonymity in wireless networks vis-à-vis a global eavesdropper was presented by [10], where each node generates a random transmission schedule, statistically independent of the session and of the schedules of other nodes in the network.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hide and code: Session anonymity in wireless line networks with coded packets

Sousa-Pinto

Lucani

Barros

2012

2012 Information Theory and Applications Workshop

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Abstract-The broadcast nature of the communication channel enables a malicious eavesdropper to gain information about connectivity and active sessions in a multi-hop wireless network. This can be achieved simply by overhearing the transmitted signals over the ether and analyzing their timings. Focusing on techniques that can meet information-theoretic criteria for session anonymity under traffic analysis attacks, we rely on a judicious choice of transmission schedules to conceal multicast or bidirectional unicast sessions from a global eavesdropper at any given point in time. A systematic approach for constructing the aforementioned transmission schedules for arbitrary network topologies is derived from an equivalent coloring problem in an auxiliary conflict graph. Although this type of anonymity requires various nodes to send dummy transmissions to confuse the eavesdropper, our results show that the additional cost in terms of energy, delay and throughput can be alleviated using network coding. The key intuition is that dummy transmissions can be replaced by coded transmissions, which carry useful information. For the case of a line network with N nodes supporting coded flows, we derive closed-form expressions, which show that anonymity comes at no cost in terms of throughput if at least one of the destinations is two hops away. The average per packet delay is shown to increase by at most 50%.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hide and code: Session anonymity in wireless line networks with coded packets

Sousa-Pinto

Lucani

Barros

2012

2012 Information Theory and Applications Workshop

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“…Very little research has been done on protecting encrypted Internet Protocol links against traffic analysis, despite warnings about the threat posed against standard protocols like IPSec [6] and TLS. Venkatraman and Newman-Wolfe [55,70] have looked at imposing traffic schedules to minimize information leaked as well as covert channels. Ways to analyse the cost and anonymity provided by such systems is presented in [54].…”

Section: Resisting Traffic Analysis On the Internetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Introducing Traffic Analysis

Clayton¹,

Danezis²

2007

Digital Privacy

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“…The other is the covert communication that Alice has to Eve. A way to stop the covert communication would be for the anonymizing device to pad [15,16,17,26,27] messages so that it would appear to Eve that both Alice and Clueless are transmitting a message. This inefficiency might be tolerated in such an ideal situation as Case 2.1, but such a strategy must be called into question when it comes to real traffic.…”

Section: Two Special Cases Of Scenario 2: -Alice Alone and With And mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…perfect anonymity can inadvertently introduce covert communication channels. We do not discuss "fixes" to the covert channel problem as has been done in traffic analysis of network communications [16,17,26,27,28]. Rather, our interest is in measuring the covert channel capacity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Covert channels and anonymizing networks

Moskowitz

Newman

Crepeau

et al. 2003

Proceedings of the 2003 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society

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There have long been threads of investigation into covert channels, and threads of investigation into anonymity, but these two closely related areas of information hiding have not been directly associated. This paper represents an initial inquiry into the relationship between covert channel capacity and anonymity, and poses more questions than it answers. Even this preliminary work has proven difficult, but in this investigation lies the hope of a deeper understanding of the nature of both areas. MIXes have been used for anonymity, where the concern is shielding the identity of the sender or the receiver of a message, or both. In contrast to traffic analysis prevention methods which conceal larger traffic patterns, we are concerned with how much information a sender to a MIX can leak to an eavesdropping outsider, despite the concealment efforts of MIXes acting as firewalls.

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Transmission schedules to prevent traffic analysis

Cited by 16 publications

References 2 publications

Hide and code: Session anonymity in wireless line networks with coded packets

Hide and code: Session anonymity in wireless line networks with coded packets

Introducing Traffic Analysis

Covert channels and anonymizing networks

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