Transnational Advocates and Labor Rights Enforcement in the North American Free Trade Agreement

Abstract

This article investigates the impact of trade‐based social clauses on labor rights enforcement. Drawing on insights from recent theoretical work on transnational advocacy networks and labor rights, the study examines how transnational groups and domestic actors engage the labor rights mechanisms under the NAFTA labor side agreement, the NAALC. A statistical analysis of original data drawn from NAALC cases complements interviews with key participants to analyze the factors that predict whether the three national mediation offices review labor dispute petitions. This study suggests that transnational activism is a key factor in explaining petition acceptance. Transnational advocates craft petitions differently from other groups and, by including worker testimony in the petitions, signal to arbitration bodies the possibility of corroborating claims through contact with affected workers.

Labour as a Transnational Actor: Alliances, Activism and the Protection of Labour Rights in the Philippines and Pakistan

“…In the process TANs use ideas, norms and information to ‘name and shame’ targeted actors in the hope of persuading them to reformulate their interests and alter their behaviour. Although targeted actors may be motivated by material concerns in responding to TAN campaigns, meaning they do not always need to internalize international norms for TANs to succeed (Nolan García, ), it is still the strategy of naming and shaming that ultimately convinces the recalcitrant state or corporation to change.…”

Restraining Gulliver: Institutional reform and the strengthening of state capacity and compliance

“…Many of these interventions resulted from amparos (injunctions), filed by individuals or groups of workers seeking to overturn CAB decisions. At times, these resulted in the court rejecting the grounds for dismissal of a union registration, or a hearing into allegations of irregularities (see Office for Inter‐American Labour Cooperation , p. ii; Nolan García )…”

The Evolution of United States–Mexico Labor Cooperation (1994‐2009): Achievements and Challenges

“…In Mexico, groups initially associated with the RMALC helped their U.S. counterparts to build those cases, gathering the information needed to meet the procedural requirements, but also collected documentation and worker testimony that could convince the U.S. or Canadian NAO to take the case on for a full review. In turn, these cross‐border strategies have been effective in securing an NAO review, as cases sponsored by cross‐border groups are three times more likely to be reviewed by an NAO than cases filed by groups that have not cultivated these relationships (Nolan Garcia 2011).…”

“…Second, the chart shows that even within cases that ultimately ended in ministerial consultations, there has been a range of activities mandated by the Ministerial Council that led to worker outreach initiatives, firm‐level reversals of government rulings or even policy change in a few cases. These outcomes were part of the consultations process but went beyond the scope of the NAALC to promote resolutions that in the end encouraged labor rights protections (Nolan Garcia 2011). While the chart lends credence to the critique that the NAALC is “toothless” because it does not go far enough on punishing labor rights violations (Bensusán 2002; Collingsworth 1996; Singh 2002; Singh and Adams 2001), the data show that even within ministerial consultations, a number of positive resolutions favorable to labor have been possible under the NAALC 13…”

“…This suggests that the NAALC process is generally not widely known within Mexico, which limits the range of cases that could have been submitted for resolution. Also, it has been noted elsewhere that filing groups have developed a sophisticated understanding of how the mechanism is enforced by the NAOs, and have learned over time how to craft petitions that will ultimately be accepted for a full review (Nolan Garcia 2011). As such, filing groups consciously select cases for submission that, once reviewed, will serve a secondary purpose, whether to push the NAO to make an official pronouncement on a recurrent labor rights issue or to ask them to investigate a labor rights area that to date has not been addressed by the panels (Finbow 2006).…”