TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Zhou, Xia; Zheng, Haitao

doi:10.1109/infcom.2009.5062011

Cited by 450 publications

(375 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…In the mechanisms proposed in (Zhou, Gandhi, Suri & Zheng 2008) and (Jia, Zhang, Zhang & Liu 2009a), social welfare is traded for low complexity using greedy algorithms while maintaining that truth-telling is still a dominant strategy. In (Zhou & Zheng 2009) double auctions have been proposed for selling spectrum in the presence of multiple competitive sellers. These auctions result in truth-telling equilibria while enabling spectrum reuse to improve spectrum utilization.…”

Section: 7mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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Section: 7mentioning

confidence: 99%

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Kakhbod

Nayyar

Sharma

et al. 2013

Mechanisms and Games for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

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“…In particular, there has been a lot of work on designing SSA mechanisms recently [4], [6], [7], [8]. There are multiple complementary ways to design SSAs, each applicable to different scenario.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These works only consider the scenario of one seller and multibuyers. Considering the scenario of multi-sellers and multibuyers, Zhou et al [8] then introduced double truthful spectrum auction to ensure the utility of both auctioneer and the buyer to be maximized by truth-telling.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence how to effectively incentivize licensed users to open-up their unutilized spectrum for sharing becomes the key issue, which is important for significantly improving spectrum utilization. In recent years, SSA has been deemed as an effective as well as efficient approach to dynamically share spectrum between unlicensed users and licensed users [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An approximate truthfulness motivated spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access

Wang

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference

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Abstract-Secondary Spectrum Auction (SSA) has been proposed as an effective approach to design spectrum sharing mechanism for dynamic spectrum access. However, due to the location-constrained spectrum interference among users, it is a great challenge to provide truthful auction with maximized spectrum utilization. Most previous SSA designs either fail in addressing truthfulness or cause loss on spectrum utilization. In this paper, we focus on providing truthful SSA with maximized spectrum utilization. In order to minimize the computational overhead involved in addressing location-constrained interference, we leverage the truthfulness by introducing approximate truthfulness. Moreover, we define a general spectrum auction model using linear programming. Based on this model, we further propose ETEX, a sealed-bid auction mechanism with approximate truthfulness. Theoretical analysis confirms that ETEX is able to achieve truthfulness in expectation with polynomial complexity. Extensive experimental results show that ETEX outperforms most popular truthful spectrum auctions in terms of social welfare, spectrum utilization and user satisfaction.

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“…A beliefassisted double auction is proposed in [8], with collusion-resistant strategies based on the use of optimal reserve prices. Another solution for double auctions is presented in [15], where several PUs auction a channel each, while several SUs bid for just one of them, assuming that all the channels are homogeneous to the SUs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Flexible Dynamic Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Game-Theoretical Mechanism Design

et al. 2011

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Abstract. In this paper we present an approach based on game-theoretical mechanism design for dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio networks. Secondary users (SU) detect when channels can be used without disrupting any primary user and try to use them opportunistically. When an SU detects a free channel, it estimates its capacity and sends the valuation of it to a central manager. The manager calculates a conflict-free allocation by implementing a truthful mechanism. The SUs have to pay for the allocation an amount which depends on the set of valuations, and they behave as benefit maximizers. We present and test two mechanisms implementing this idea which are proved to be truthful, and that are tractable and approximately efficient. We show the flexibility of these mechanisms by illustrating how they can be modified to achieve other objectives such as fairness and also how they can operate without really charging the SUs.

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TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions

Cited by 450 publications

References 19 publications

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

Power allocation and spectrum sharing in wireless networks: an implementation theory approach

An approximate truthfulness motivated spectrum auction for dynamic spectrum access

Flexible Dynamic Spectrum Allocation in Cognitive Radio Networks Based on Game-Theoretical Mechanism Design

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