2016
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12445
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Trust and Decision‐making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine

Abstract: It is a common assumption that through decades of co‐operation there has been an emergence of trust between the Member States of the European Union. Yet, we have little evidence about the nature of trust and its implications for decision‐making, in particular in times of crisis. Hence, our article's central question: how does trust matter in the process of decision‐making during crisis? Our argument is that uncertainty during the crisis enabled trust‐building between the actors: Member States and European inst… Show more

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Cited by 34 publications
(19 citation statements)
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“…Relevant literature has been dissecting the events in Ukraine following the Revolution of Dignity, and specifically dealing with the Russia–Ukraine conflict that has been ongoing since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014 (see a Special Issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies (Davis Cross and Karolewski (2017a)); as well as works by Kuzio (2015a, 2015b, 2017); Natorski (2016, 2018; Natorski and Pomorska, 2017); Wolczuk (2016)). Kuzio (2017: 194) argued that the EU’s policies pre-Maidan were ‘constrained by its failure to appreciate that Russia no longer viewed the EU and NATO as different actors and that Russia was opposed to both of their enlargements into its “zone of privileged interests”’ (Kuzio citing Wawrzonek, 2014).…”
Section: Context: Eu Mediation In the Russia–ukraine Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Relevant literature has been dissecting the events in Ukraine following the Revolution of Dignity, and specifically dealing with the Russia–Ukraine conflict that has been ongoing since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in February–March 2014 (see a Special Issue of the Journal of Common Market Studies (Davis Cross and Karolewski (2017a)); as well as works by Kuzio (2015a, 2015b, 2017); Natorski (2016, 2018; Natorski and Pomorska, 2017); Wolczuk (2016)). Kuzio (2017: 194) argued that the EU’s policies pre-Maidan were ‘constrained by its failure to appreciate that Russia no longer viewed the EU and NATO as different actors and that Russia was opposed to both of their enlargements into its “zone of privileged interests”’ (Kuzio citing Wawrzonek, 2014).…”
Section: Context: Eu Mediation In the Russia–ukraine Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pattern across Europe's historical response to crisis of various sorts shows that there is more to this than the cliché implies (Cross 2017). When a crisis is perceived to be particularly severe, new dynamics often emerge within Europe, such as new levels of trust in EU institutions (Natorski and Pomorska 2016), desire for member states to stand together despite initial resistance (Orenstein and Keleman 2016), sense of common identity or rally-around-the-flag effect (i.e. us vs. them), policy innovation (Bicchi 2007;Cross 2017), political will to do more or spend more in reaction to the crisis (Schilde 2016), and so on.…”
Section: Why a Strengthening Of European Boundaries?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This included the Baltic republics and Poland, followed by the Nordics, Romania and the UK (Dobbs 2017). At the opposite end of the spectrum, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Portugal and Spain, but also Hungary and Austria (Webber 2019), were inclined to engage with Russia due to burgeoning economic ties, cultural and religious links and/or the absence of recent conflicts (Natorski and Pomorska 2017;Nitoiu 2016). In-between both, key members France and Germany adopted a moderate position.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Capitalizing on these divisions, Russia has attempted to split domestic opinion in EU member states in the hope of obstructing the renewal of sanctions and, more generally, EU foreign policy (Karolewski and Davis-Cross 2017;Natorski and Pomorska 2017). Moscow strengthened bilateral ties with selected EU capitals, supported Kremlin-friendly parties, spread disinformation ahead of elections and imposed counter-sanctions in the form of a food embargo which penalized vulnerable EU economies (Karlsen 2019;Orenstein and Kelemen 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%