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In response to Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014, the EU introduced sanctions on Moscow. Despite increasing polarisation among member states after imposition, the sanctions package was consistently renewed. How can sanctions persistence be explained? While scholarly accounts highlight German leadership, commitment to norms, and policymakers' engagement, the EU's ability to uphold the sanctions in the face of uneven support among member states remains puzzling. With the help of a two-level game framework, according to which actors make decisions based on the interplay between the domestic and international levels, we argue that the interaction between the Council and domestic politics helped sustaining the consensus. To illustrate this dynamic, in an exploration of domestic factions in Spain and Poland, two member states displaying opposite attitudes towards Russia, we identify the presence of at least one actor whose preference deviates from the core, thereby facilitating consensus.

This article explores whether the EU behaves differently as a sanctioning actor towards its geographic vicinity than to regions further afield. It looks at the security relevance of the objectives advanced by sanctions, as well as the interplay between objectives and the geographic proximity of the targets to the EU in its autonomous sanctions practice (1987-2003). It identifies a pattern of geographic differentiation: Eastern Europe has been targeted for the widest variety of reasons, while in the Southern Mediterranean the only focus has been on terrorism. In Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa most sanctions have been geared towards the promotion of democracy and Human Rights.

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