Truthmaking, metaethics, and creeping minimalism

Asay, Jamin

doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9808-0

Cited by 62 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Applied to our example, her proposal is that a realist holds that what it is for genocide to be wrong involves the essence of genocide and wrongness, while an expressivist claims that something's being wrong is a matter of our taking a negative attitude toward it. Similarly, Asay (2013) argues that, although realists and expressivists might agree on what the truthmakers for normative claims are, they nevertheless offer conflicting explanations of the truthmaking relations themselves. Realists talk about the de re properties of objects in accounting for why the relevant truthmaking relations hold, he says, while expressivists must appeal to our attitudes being projected onto the world when explaining the same facts.…”

Section: Some Philosophers Have Proposed That Even If We Assume Thismentioning

confidence: 99%

Expressivism and realist explanations

Golub

2016

Philos Stud

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It is often claimed that there is an explanatory divide between expressivism and normative realism: more precisely, that the two views offer conflicting explanations of (i) the metaphysical structure of the normative realm, (ii) the connection between normative judgment and motivation, (iii) our normative beliefs and any convergence thereof, or (iv) the content of normative thoughts and claims. In this paper I argue that there need be no such explanatory conflict. Given a minimalist approach to the relevant metaphysical and semantic notions, expressivism is compatible with any explanation that would be acceptable as a general criterion for realism.

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Section: Some Philosophers Have Proposed That Even If We Assume Thismentioning

confidence: 99%

Expressivism and realist explanations

Golub

2016

Philos Stud

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“…Instead, it's a metaethical view as to what is responsible for the truth of moral judgments. Hence, even if pluralists have a good account of what makes moral judgments true (which I doubt on independent grounds that I won't go into here—see Asay ), it doesn't follow that they thereby have defended pluralism.…”

Section: Challenging Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 94%

Putting Pluralism in its Place

Asay

2016

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.

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“…36–39). Critics of Fine's test in meta‐ethics have wondered whether the quasi‐realist should embrace the notion of metaphysical explanation on which the test depends (Asay, ). But there is a deeper problem with the test—it relies on a questionable principle of ground.…”

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confidence: 99%