Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Bağcı, Hüseyin; Kurç, Çağlar

doi:10.1080/14702436.2016.1262742

Cited by 20 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In the third strand, linkages between the arms trade and other institutional and macroeconomic factors are oriented toward, inter alia : dependence on arms transfer and conflict in foreign policy (Kinsella ); the U.S. rhetoric against the arms trade in the enhancement of democracy and human rights in developing countries (Blanton ); instruments of repression concerning arms imports and human rights in developing countries (Blanton ); the global arms trade and regional security complexes (Kinsella ); analyses of the evolving structure of the arms trade (Kinsella ); connections between military balances, arms transfers, and interstate relations (Sanjian ); nexuses between U.S. arms transfers, democracy, and human rights (Blanton ); comparative analyses on the effects of U.S. versus Chinese arms transfers (De Soysa and Midford ); insights into associations between international reputation, human rights, and arms exports (Erickson ); geostrategic aims of arms trade and strategic choices between buying versus making weapons (Bağci and Kurç ; Blank and Levitzky ); and finally, chemical weapons use, domestic repressions, and growing tendencies in nuclear weapons delivery systems (Brathwaite ; Wasson and Bluesteen ).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

2020

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This article investigates persistence (or hysteresis) in weapons using a panel of 163 countries for the period 2010‐15. The following are some main findings: (1) compared to countries that are landlocked, persistence in heavy weapons is more apparent in nations that are open to the sea; (2) relative to the Middle East and North Africa, heavy weapons are more persistent in the East Asia and the Pacific countries. This tendency is consistent with “weapons imports;” (3) evidence of persistence is not very apparent in “weapons imports” with the exception of the fact that it is higher in low‐income countries, compared to their high‐income counterparts. Hence, there is less hysteresis in weapons exports when compared with heavy weapons exports; and (4) the determinants of persistence employed in the conditioning information set are contingent on fundamental characteristics and panels. Policy implications are discussed. Related Articles Beal, Amanda L., and Leah Graham. 2014. “Foundations for Change: Rule of Law, Development, and Democratization.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 311‐345. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12077 Fails, Matthew D. 2014. “Leader Turnover, Volatility, and Political Risk.” Politics & Policy 42 (3): 369‐399. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12078 Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. “State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation.” Politics & Policy 42 (1): 3‐36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057 Peev, Evgeni, and Dennis C. Mueller. 2013. “Democracy, Economic Freedom and Growth in Transition Economies.” Kyklos 65 (3): 371‐407. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6435.2012.00543.x/abstract Siddiqui, Danish A., and Qazi M. Ahmed. 2013. “The Effect of Institutions on Economic Growth: A Global Analysis Based on GMM Dynamic Panel Estimation.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 24: 18‐33. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X12000902

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confidence: 99%

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

2020

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“…Following the 2016 coup, the ratio of pilots to combat planes in the Turkish air force dropped from 2 to 0.8 pilots per plane (Gürcan 2016). At the same time, the expansion of the Turkish arms industry has improved the military's ability to acquire new weapons and technologies (Bağcı and Kurç 2017). 3 Consequently, despite the reduced ratio of pilots to combat planes, the Turkish armed forces can still credibly threaten the Greek airspace due to increased military spending.…”

Section: Turkish Military Spending and Assertive Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

Choulis

Mehrl

Ifantis

2021

Defence and Peace Economics

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Arms races are linked in the public conscience to potential violence. Following gas discoveries in eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey nearly came to blows in August 2020 and both states have enacted military expansion plans, further risking escalation. We present a novel approach to study the effect of military build-ups on dispute intensity, using monthly data on Turkish incursions into Greek-claimed airspace. Because airspace claims feature strongly in the dispute, these contestations represent an appropriate measure of the intensity with which Turkey pursues the conflict. Theoretically, we suggest that bilateral factors drive this intensity. We argue that increased Greek military capabilities deter incursions whereas increased Turkish military capabilities fuel them. Results from time-series models support the second expectation. Consequently, the study provides a novel methodological approach to studying interstate conflict intensity and shines new light on escalation dynamics in the Greek-Turkish dispute.

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“…Turkey’s growing popularity in the Middle East and Syria fed on each other. When Turkey declared its new foreign policy under the headline “zero problems with neighbors,” the declaration entailed not only “establishing good relations with neighbors” but also not becoming “embroiled in regional conflicts and disputes” (Bağcı & Kurç, 2016). Ankara viewed mediation as the key to acquiring more influence in the region.…”

Section: Cooperation Mediation and Regional Influence Via Syria: 20mentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Power Role and Intervention: The Turkish Case Over Syria in the 2000s

Sever

2020

Contemporary Review of the Middle East

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The article elaborates how Turkey’s relations with Syria, which have been pursued by varying foreign policy instruments and conduct, have greatly affected Turkey’s standing on the Middle East during the 2000s. By employing the relevant concepts, “regional power” and “third party intervention” in the literature, the article aims to explain the changes caused by the Syrian conflict in the AKP’s ( Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—the Justice and Development Party) foreign policy in a better frame. After the Syrian conflict, Turkey’s increasing intervention in Syria including use of force resulted in a new power projection other than soft power in its regional relations. Neighboring a civil war state caused Ankara to organize its relations with Syria and the Middle East in a new context which requires new mechanisms, new partnerships, and new interpretations in the face of rising nongovernmental armed groups, refugee flows, changing regional alignments, and diverging interests with its major Western allies.

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Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Cited by 20 publications

References 15 publications

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

The Persistence of Weapons: Global Evidence

Arms Racing, Military Build-Ups and Dispute Intensity: Evidence from the Greek-Turkish Rivalry, 1985-2020

Regional Power Role and Intervention: The Turkish Case Over Syria in the 2000s

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