Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a Test Case

Abstract

In a lengthy and sometimes heated exchange in the American Political Science Review in 1974, Walter Dean Burnham, Philip E. Converse, and Jerrold G. Rusk clashed over two topics which have long been matters of debate among political scientists: the role of legal institutions in shaping human behavior, and the generalizability to other populations of findings based on a particular method and drawn from a specific place or era. 1 Nine years earlier, Burnham had challenged the American Voter's survey-based portrait of the United States electorate by compiling, from aggregate electoral data, five indices of late nineteenthcentury American voters' involvement in politics. Contending that these earlier Americans were much more interested in and seemingly informed about politics than their mid-twentieth century counterparts, Burnham asserted that the overwhelming 1896 McKinley victory and the succeeding political hegemony of major business interests had alienated previously active lower-class voters from the electoral system by robbing them of a real and effective alternative to corporate domination. Exogenous events-the decline in the non-Southern opposition to the Republicans and a capitalist takeover of the GOP-had caused a shift in the pattern of electoral participation. 2 Converse and Rusk countered with the argument that different exogenous events produced legal changes which in turn caused apparent alterations in behavior. Aiming only to reduce corruption and free individuals to express their political opinions fully, Mugwumps and Progressives, according to Converse and Rusk, introduced strict registration and Australian ballot laws. Such laws decreased fraud

Local Funds and Political Competition: Evidence from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

“…However, the di §erential relationship within close elections is unexplored in their analysis. These results are also in contrast to the literature that points out that pre-election transfer of funds are only useful in getting voters to election booths and not for a §ecting their voting choice (Cox and Kousser 1981).…”

“…A district is a collection of blocks. 8 The elected heads of Gram Panchayats are also members of Panchayat Samitis. In contrast to members elected directly into the council, they have no declared party a¢liation.…”

Fabricating votes for Putin: new tests of fraud and electoral manipulations from Russia

“…Election-day fraud usually refers to ballot-stuffing, tampering with vote tallies, and other forms of interference with voting results (Argersinger 1985;Calingaert 2006;Cox and Kousser 1981;Gerring and Thacker 2004;Lehoucq 2003). Researchers have therefore pointed to limited specificity of last-digit tests as a forensic tool because last-digit tests target a specific type of fraud mostly consisting of the writing in of made-up numbers on precinct return sheets and may not detect cases of forced voting, multiple voting, and ballot stuffing (Enikolopov, Korovkin et al 2013).…”

Political Corruption and Presidential Elections, 1929-1992

“…But the ballot reforms of the late nineteenth century along with increased federal and state regulation of politics diminished-or at least altered-the opportunities for ballotrelated corruption (Burnham 1965(Burnham , 1974(Burnham , 1986Converse 1972;Cox and Kousser 1981;Allen and Allen 1981;Mayfield 1993). 2 Through much of the period 1865-1929, information about political corruption was largely local and intimately connected with machine politics and reform (see, for instance, Steffens 1931;Riordan 1994;Gosnell 1968;Merton 1957;Banfield and Wilson 1963;Wolfinger 1972;Bridges 1984;Grimshaw 1992).…”