Two Generic Methods of Analyzing Stream Ciphers

Jiao, Lin; Zhang, Bin; Wang, Mingsheng

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-23318-5_21

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…In 2014, Wu had submitted an authenticated encryption cipher, known as ACORN v1 to CAESAR competition. After then, some attacks on ACORN v1 and its tweaked version ACORN v2 were presented in [5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. Besides these attacks, a cube attack on 477 rounds of ACORN v2 was proposed in [12] to recover the 128-bit key with a total attack complexity of 2 35 , and when the goal is to recover one bit of the secret key, 503 rounds of ACORN v2 were attacked.…”

Section: Previous Attacks On Acornmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Algebraic Degree Estimation of ACORN v3 Using Numeric Mapping

Ding

Wang

et al. 2019

Security and Communication Networks

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ACORN v3 is a lightweight authenticated encryption cipher, which was selected as one of the seven nalists of CAESAR competition in March 2018. It is intended for lightweight applications (resource-constrained environments). By using the technique numeric mapping proposed at CRYPTO 2017, an e cient algorithm for algebraic degree estimation of ACORN v3 is proposed. As a result, new distinguishing attacks on 647, 649, 670, 704, and 721 initialization rounds of ACORN v3 are obtained, respectively. So far, as we know, all of our distinguishing attacks on ACORN v3 are the best. e e ectiveness and accuracy of our algorithm is con rmed by the experimental results.

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Section: Previous Attacks On Acornmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2) For t from 1 to N do: (3) D (t) ⟵DEG(State Update 128(S (t− 1) ), D (t− 1) ); (4) Compute DEG(f, D (N) ); (5) Return DEG(f, D (N) ).…”

Section: 32mentioning

confidence: 99%

Algebraic Degree Estimation of ACORN v3 Using Numeric Mapping

Ding

Wang

et al. 2019

Security and Communication Networks

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“…Wang et al [17] recover the state of ACORN in nonce-reuse attack.The cube attack on 477 initialization rounds of ACORN v1 can recover the 128-bit key with a complexity of 2 35 . Jiao et al [18] evaluated the security of ACORN v1 by using linear approximations, which needs about 2 157 tests. Recently, a sat-based cryptanalysis of ACORN v3 is given by Lafitte [19].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN

Shi¹,

Gao²

2019

KSII TIIS

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ACORN is an authenticated encryption algorithm proposed as a candidate in the currently ongoing CAESAR competition. ACORN has a good performance on security and efficiency which has been a third-round candidate. This paper mainly concentrates on the security of ACORN under the forgery attack and the non-repudiation of ACORN. Firstly, we analyze the differential properties of the feedback function in ACRON are analyzed. By taking advantage of these properties, the forgery attacks on round-reduced ACORN are proposed with a success probability higher than 2-128 when the number of finalization rounds is less than 87. Moreover, the non-repudiation of ACRON in the nonce-reuse setting is analyzed. The known collision can be used to deny the authenticated message with probability 2-120. This paper demonstrates that ACORN cannot generate the non-repudiation completely. We believe it is an undesirable property indeed.

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“…There are other analysis results on ACORN such that Liu and Lin [4] described the slid properties and proposed a state recovering attack with computational complexity 2 164 . Then Jiao and Zhang [5] used guessing strategy to give a security evaluation with computational complexity 2 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonce-reuse Attack on Authenticated Cipher ACORN

Wang¹,

Hu²,

Liu³

2017

dtcse

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Abstract. ACORN is a lightweight authenticated cipher designed for CAESAR competition. This cipher is insecure if nonce is reused or the decrypted plaintext is given as output when verification fails. We use the algebraic characteristics of the output function and the feedback function to recover the state of ACORN on the condition of nonce reuse. Our attack results show that the computational complexity can fall below 2 128 for 2 chosen plaintexts with a common nonce that are better than the front attacks.

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Two Generic Methods of Analyzing Stream Ciphers

Cited by 10 publications

References 18 publications

Algebraic Degree Estimation of ACORN v3 Using Numeric Mapping

Algebraic Degree Estimation of ACORN v3 Using Numeric Mapping

Cryptanalysis of the Authentication in ACORN

Nonce-reuse Attack on Authenticated Cipher ACORN

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