Two Takes on the Social Brain: A Comparison of Theory of Mind Tasks

Abstract

Abstract& We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing-false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions-to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/ PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)-components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)-the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)-components of the distributed neural system for action understanding-and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form. &

Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

“…These prior studies show consistent neural activation for the processing of verbal and visual stimuli that depict mental states: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), right and left temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ, LTPJ), and precuneus (den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005;Fletcher, et al, 1995;Frith & Frith, 2003;Gallagher, et al, 2000;Ruby & Decety, 2003;Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;Vogeley, et al, 2001). Of these regions, the RTPJ has been shown to be particularly selective for processing mental states with representational content such as thoughts and beliefs Ciaramidaro, et al, 2007;Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007;Saxe & Wexler, 2005). For example, the response in the RTPJ is high when participants read stories that describe a person's beliefs, true or false, but low during other socially salient stories describing, for example, a person's physical appearance, cultural background, or even internal subjective sensations that lack representational content, i.e.…”

Effects of emotion regulation strategy on brain responses to the valence and social content of visual scenes

“…Likewise, increased activity in PCC has been observed during tasks involving the attribution of emotion to self and/or other (Johnson et al, 2006;Ochsner, Knierim et al, 2004) and during theory of mind (Gobbini, Koralek, Bryan, Montgomery, & Haxby, 2007), besides an activation to social stimuli and affective information about familiar persons in general (Britton et al, 2006;Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & Vuilleumier, 2005;Vrtička, Andersson, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2009). Therefore, the response of mPFC and PCC to social versus nonsocial images in our study was most likely related to mentalizing processes and the attribution of emotional experi-ences to humans seen in social images, as opposed to the inanimate displays seen in nonsocial images.…”

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

“…To agree with subjective claims, it is assumed that participants must hold on to some mental state representation (either their own or others', see Saxe, 2009). Haxby, 2007;Ruby & Decety, 2003;Saxe & Kanwisher 2003;Saxe & Powell, 2006;Vogeley et al, 2001;Young et al, 2010;Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007;Young, Scholz & Saxe, 2011;Young & Saxe, 2008;2009). Some ToM ROIs, such as RTPJ, have been shown to play a critical role in moral judgment (Young et al, 2010;Young & Saxe, 2009); however, researchers have hypothesized that these regions are critical to processes underlying moral judgment (e.g.…”