U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

Abstract

Since World War II, few countries have been of greater strategic concern to the United States than Iran. Whether as a dependable friend and preeminent regional partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has occupied a special place in U.S. security thinking. It exerts influence on a range of important policy issues-from the Middle East peace process to post-Taliban Afghanistan-and when it acquires nuclear weapons capability within the next decade, it could become a significant factor driving U.S. and regional government policies on proliferation.Since September 11, there has been much speculation in both countries about the possibility of a new opening in relations. Like America, Iran wants an Iraq without Saddam Hussein, Afghanistan under a stable government, and Central Asia absent Russian control of borders and resources. Yet dramatic breakthroughs in U.S.-Iran relations appear unlikely. Iran's reformist and conservative camps may be actively debating whether rapprochement with the United States is in Tehran's future, but no signs indicate that the conditions for achieving normalcy would be minimally acceptable to Washington. U.S. options must encompass several factors that shape decisionmaking in today's Iran: the rise of Persian nationalism, the consensus among leaders on foreign and security issues, the weakness of President Mohammad Khatami in the face of conservative obstacles to reform, fears of encirclement, and a bias toward self-sufficiency in defense posture.American policy can open a door, but Tehran must decide if and when to walk through it.

The Iranian Nuclear Challenge

“…Israel is seen as another external threat because of Tehran's opposition to the peace process and its support for anti-Israel terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine. 54 Moreover, Israel possesses a significant nuclear arsenal with long-range delivery systems, 55 and has demonstrated its preparedness to take preventive action against emerging nuclear threats. 56 There is an argument, however, that Iranian references to Israel as a threat are employed primarily to mobilize regional and domestic opinion.…”